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Americans should not expect one battle but a lengthy campaign, unlike
any other we have ever seen. It may include dramatic strikes, visible on TV,
and covert operations, secret even in success. We will starve terrorists of
t B.A. 2001, Wesleyan University; J.D. 2004, Cornell Law School, 2004. Special
thanks to Craig Waldman. We are forever reminded of the lasting consequences of
government action by "the Boss," who sang:
Down in the shadow of the penitentiary
Out by the gas fires of the refinery
I'm ten years
I'm fifteen years
I'm twenty-five years burnin' down the road
I got nowhere to run now
I got nowhere to run now
I was born in the U.S.A .....
Bruce Springsteen, Born in the U.S.A., on BRUCE SPRINGSTEEN & THE E STREET BAND-LIVE
IN NEW YORK CITY (Sony 2001).
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funding, turn them one against another, drive them from place to place, until
there is no refuge or no rest. And we will pursue nations that provide aid or
safe haven to terrorism. Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to
make: Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists.'
-President George W. Bush
Introduction
Imagine for a moment that the United States, or for that matter any
country whose nationals perished as a result of the attacks of September
11, 2001, knew that Osama bin Laden had survived the siege at Tora Bora,
Afghanistan,2 and planned to travel on a common carrier to a nonextradi-
tion country from which he would launch renewed attacks. Assume fur-
ther that the United States had the ability to intercept this carrier and
capture bin Laden, albeit only by infringing upon international air space,
and only through covert action that excluded the involvement of the vehi-
cle's host nation-one which failed to prosecute him. How should the
United States respond? Should it refrain from self-help and allow a wanted
terrorist to escape to a safe haven that will neither prosecute nor extradite
him-to a nation from which he can create more terror?3 No. Instead,
should the United States seize the opportunity to remove a wanted terrorist
from circulation and thereby deter other potential threats? Yes.
In addressing an actual or imminent terrorist attack, the Bush Doc-
trine endorses a policy of preemptive action and sets forth a policy of hunt-
ing down and eliminating known terrorists, and of targeting terrorist-
1. President George W. Bush, Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the
United States Response to the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1142
(Sept. 20, 2001), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname
=2001_presidential documents&docid=PD24seoltxt-26.pdf; see also President George
W. Bush, Commencement Address at the United States Military Academy in West Point,
New York, 38 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 944, 946-47 (June 1, 2002), available at http://
frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=2002 presidential_documents&
docid=pdl0jn02jtxt-5.pdf [hereinafter Address at the United States Military Academy]
(articulating the "Bush Doctrine," which allows for preemptive strikes based on the the-
ory that "[i]f we wait for threats to fully materialize, we will have waited too long").
2. Philip Smucker, Bin Laden in Pakistan, Source Claims, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR
(Boston), Dec. 13, 2001, at 2, available at http://csmonitor.com/2001/1213/plsl-wosc.
html (reporting that Osama bin Laden escaped the siege at Tora Bora); Dana Bash, Bin
Laden Will Be Caught, White House Vows (Dec. 16, 2003), at http://www.cnn.com/2003/
US/12/16/wh.bin.laden/index.html (describing continued search for bin Laden); see
also Jack Kelley, Officials: Voice on Tape Is bin Laden, USA. TODAY, Nov. 13, 2002, at Al
(reporting that after conducting a preliminary intelligence analysis, U.S. officials
expressed confidence that a tape featuring bin Laden, which had been aired on Al-
Jazeera, was authentic). But see Terrorism Notebook, SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 30, 2002, at A4
(reporting that Swiss voice recognition experts doubted the authenticity of the audi-
otape after they compared it with ninety minutes of known recordings of bin Laden's
voice).
3. See generally Abraham Abramovsky, Extraterritorial jurisdiction: The United
States' Unwarranted Attempt to Alter International Law in United States v. Yunis, 15 YALE
J. INT'L L. 121, 141 (1990) (noting that Article 8 of the Hostage Taking Convention
requires the state in which the offender is found to either extradite or prosecute the
accused).
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sponsoring states by seeking to limit their development of weapons of mass
destruction. 4 The Doctrine's aggressive counterterrorist position would
seem to encompass measures like forcible abduction5 as a means for cap-
turing and prosecuting terrorists. The Executive's intolerance for uncoop-
erative nations, its commitment to thwarting terrorism, and the
international presence of terrorist organizations suggest that forcible
abduction is likely to become both an increasingly feasible tactical option
as well as a potentially effective method for disrupting terrorist activity.
6
Indeed, the Solicitor General's response filed to the Supreme Court certify-
ing the Alien Tort Claims Act ("ATCA") portion of the Alvarez-Machain case
reflects the Administration's desire to reserve the right to use this form of
self-help in the war on terror.7 Given the United States government's recep-
tiveness to the idea of abducting terrorists as a means to ensure security,
the question becomes whether forcible abduction has a proper place within
international law.8
4. THE WHITE HOUSF, THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA 3-4 (2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf ("America
will hold to account nations that are comprised by terror, including those who harbor
terrorists .... The United States and countries cooperating with us must not allow the
terrorists to develop new home bases. Together, we will seek to deny them sanctuary at
every turn."); see also Thomas J. Farer, Beyond the Charter Frame: Unilateralism or Condo-
minium?, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 359, 359 (2002) (suggesting that the United States' parachut-
ing troops into countries to seize suspected terrorists is a measure falling within the
Bush Doctrine); Address at the Unites States Military Academy, supra note 1, at 945-48.
5. See Robert J. Beck & Anthony Clark Arend, "Don't Tread on Us": International
Law and Forcible State Responses to Terrorism, 12 WIs. INT'L L.J. 153, 174 (1994) (defin-
ing abduction as "the forcible, unconsented removal of a person by the agents of one
State from the territory [or jurisdiction] of another State"); see also Paul Michell, English-
Speaking Justice: Evolving Responses to Transnational Forcible Abduction After Alvarez-
Machain, 29 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 383, 389-90 (1996) (defining abduction as consisting of
four primary elements: (1) a fugitive present in one State who is suspected or has been
convicted of committing a crime in another state; (2) state-sponsored abduction of this
fugitive by means of force or threats of force; (3) an extraterritorial aspect to this act of
law enforcement; and (4) involvement of state agents).
6. See Adam W. Wegner, Note, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Under International
Law: The Yunis Decision as a Modelfor the Prosecution of Terrorists in U.S. Courts, 22 LAW
& POL'Y INT'L Bus. 409, 411 (1991) (discussing the increase of terrorism since the early
1970s).
7. The Solicitor General's brief indicated that "transborder arrests without the
other government's consent . . . are exceedingly rare, [but that] threats to the nation's
security are now, more than ever, transnational phenomena." Petition for a Writ of Cer-
tiorari at 15-16, United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992) (No. 03-485).
The Solicitor General's brief concluded that the executive branch, not the courts, is the
proper place for decisions involving national security to be made. Id. at 29-30; see also
Robert S. Greenberger, High Court to Rule on Arrest Abroad: U.S. Cites Terrorism Fight;
Suspect's Lawyer Says Security Wasn't at Stake, WALL ST. J., Dec. 2, 2003, at A6 (discuss-
ing the U.S. government's position in Alvarez-Machain).
8. Compare Douglas Kash, Abducting Terrorists Under PDD-39: Much Ado About
Nothing New, 13 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 139 (1997) (arguing that forcible abduction is
justified when all other avenues of obtaining jurisdiction over a fugitive have been
exhausted), Jordan J. Paust, After Alvarez-Macham: Abduction, Standing, Denials of Jus-
tice, and Unaddressed Human Rights Claims, 67 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 551, 563 (1993) (argu-
ing that international law should not prohibit all transnational abductions of criminal
fugitives because the constitutional and human rights of defendants to be free from for-
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Traditionally, two principal justifications have been offered to support
the use of force when abducting terrorists: first, that a state seeking to pro-
tect its nationals may seize a terrorist if this measure is likely to prevent the
terrorist from engaging in future attacks and if the mission is strictly lim-
ited to apprehension;9 and second, that abduction is a form of self-defense
so long as it satisfies the requirements of necessity and proportionality,
and so long as the abducting state can show complicity by the territorial
state. 10 Both justifications allow for cross-border incursions to capture
fugitives and excuse any violation of the territorial state's sovereignty. Crit-
ics of forcible abduction, however, emphasize the severity of infringements
of territorial integrity, violation of international law, the potential for error,
retaliation, and the costs of incurring the ire of the international commu-
nity.11 Still, the Ninth Circuit recently reiterated that "[its] review of the
international authorities and literature reveals no specific binding obliga-
cible abduction must be weighed against the rights of victims to an effective remedy in
front of a domestic tribunal), Theodore C. Jonas, Note, International "Fugitive Snatching"
in U.S. Law: Two Views from Opposite Ends of the Eighties, 24 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 521, 561(1991) (arguing that abductions of fugitives, while constituting violations of interna-
tional law, are within the President's constitutional powers over law enforcement and
foreign affairs), and Richard B. Lillich, Forcible Self-Help by States to Protect Human
Rights, 53 IOWA L. REv. 325, 348 (1967) (arguing that forcible abductions of fugitives are
permissible only where necessary to prevent or redress grave violations of human
rights), with MichaelJ. Glennon, State-Sponsored Abduction: A Comment on United States
v. Alvarez-Machain, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 746 (1992) (conceding that state-sponsored abduc-
tions may be an effective law enforcement measure, but reasoning that, since such mea-
sures would "discard[ ] altogether ... international stability," the United States should
not employ this practice), Aaron Schwabach & S.A. Patchett, Doctrine or Dictum: The
Ker-Frisbie Doctrine and Official Abductions Which Breach International Law, 25 U. MIAMI
INTER-AM. L. REV. 19, 44 (1993) (arguing that forcible abductions of criminal defendants
without the consent of the host country violate customary international law), Stephan
Wilske & Teresa Schiller, Jurisdiction over Persons Abducted in Violation of International
Law in the Aftermath of United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 5 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE
205, 211-12 (1998) (analyzing judicial decisions of various countries and concluding
that abductions of fugitives constitute violations of customary international law), Jac-
ques Semmelman, Due Process, International Law, and Jurisdiction over Criminal Defend-
ants Abducted Extraterritorially: The Ker-Frisbie Doctrine Reexamined, 30 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 513, 551-552 (1992) (arguing that a court would violate customary inter-
national law by continuing to exercise jurisdiction over an abducted defendant when the
country from which that defendant had been abducted had formally protested the
abduction and had demanded the return of the defendant), and Scott S. Evans, Interna-
tional Kidnapping in a Violent World: Where the United States Ought to Draw the Line, 137
MIL. L. REv. 187, 195 (1992) (arguing that international abduction infringes on the terri-
torial integrity and sovereignty of another state, that it violates basic human rights, and
that it disrupts world public order).
9. Douglas Kash, Abductions of Terrorists in International Airspace and on the High
Seas, 8 FLA. J. INT'L L. 65, 79 (1993).
10. Id.
11. See generally Wilske & Schiller, supra note 8, at 212-41 (noting that interna-
tional organizations, including the Inter-American Juridical Committee acting on behalf
of the Organization of American States, as well as several countries such as England,
South Africa, and France, have found forcible abductions to be a violation of interna-
tional law); Farah Hussain, Note, A Functional Response to International Crime: An Inter-
national Justice Commission, 70 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 755, 766 & n.46 (1996) (arguing thatforcible abductions infringe on state sovereignty, a right that is reiterated in the Restate-
ment (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States, Introductory Note to Part
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tion, express or implied, on the part of the United States or its agents to
refrain from transborder kidnapping .... 12
After September 11th, the traditional justifications seem even more
forceful given the expanded reach of terrorist organizations and the reality
of sudden large-scale attacks; however, they are also susceptible to over-
reaching. As such, the practice of abducting terrorists is better justified as
a form of efficient breach, 13 which functions as a crisis management
1 (1987)); Michell, supra note 5, at 410 (describing forcible abduction as a violation of
international human rights law).
12. Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 331 F.3d 604, 619 (9th Cir. 2003). The major-
ity concluded that "[b]ecause a human rights norm recognizing an individual's right to
be free from transborder abductions has not reached a status of international accord
sufficient to render it 'obligatory' or 'universal,' it cannot qualify as an actionable norm
under the ATCA." Id. at 620. The court ultimately found for Alvarez-Machain on the
grounds that the "unilateral, nonconsensual extraterritorial arrest and detention of Alva-
rez were arbitrary and in violation of the law of nations under the ATCA." Id.
13. Efficient breach is the claim of law and economics scholars that first, there are
circumstances where breach of a particular contract is more efficient than performance,
and second, that where this is true, the law ought to encourage breach because all par-
ties will benefit. See Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Joel P. Trachtman, Economic Analysis of Interna-
tional Law, 24 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 31 (1999); see also Richard A. Posner, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW 95-96 (4th ed. 1992); Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Liquidated
Damages, Penalties and the Just Compensation Principle: Some Notes on an Enforcement
Model and a Theory of Efficient Breach, 77 COLUM. L. REv. 554, 578 (1977) ("In the
absence of evidence of unfairness or other bargaining abnormalities, efficiency would be
maximized by the enforcement of the agreed allocation of risks embodied in a liquidated
damages clause."); Gerald B. Wetlaufer, Systems of Belief in Modern American Law: A
Viewfrom Century's End, 49 Am. U. L. REv. 1, 34-43 (1999) (describing the "strong" and
"weak" forms of law and economics theory); Richard Morrison, Efficient Breach of Inter-
national Agreements, 23 DENY. J. INT'L L. & PoL'Y 183, 184-85 (1994). Morrison
explains the theory of efficient breach as applied to international agreements in the fol-
lowing way:
In determining whether a party will comply with a contract, a common
assumption is that the non-breaching party will act rationally. A party will
break the contract if the cost of breaching the contract is less than the cost of
compliance with the contract; conversely, a party will comply with the contract
if the cost of breaching the contract exceeds the cost of compliance. The legal
remedy for breach affects a party's decision to breach. If the penalty is high, few
breaches will occur; if the penalty is low, breaches will occur more frequently.
Thus, the legal system can achieve an optimal rate of contract breach by award-
ing the appropriate measure of damages.
There are two legal avenues that permit efficient breach. First, there are a
number of domestic legal doctrines, such as impossibility, that completely for-
give contractual performance. Second, a party can breach a contract if it is will-
ing to pay the cost of breach, including paying a judgment or a settlement fee.
In an efficient breach, the costs of breach will not exceed its benefits, and the
party will choose to breach the contract.
Id. at 184-85 (footnotes omitted).
To illustrate this point, Morrison discusses the following example:
[Sluppose that a manufacturer (the "seller") agrees to sell a machine for $100.
Assume that the machine costs $80 to make. Suppose further that the seller
finds another buyer who is willing to pay $130 for the machine. If the seller
breaks his contract with the original buyer and sells to the second buyer, the
seller will earn a profit of $50 instead of a profit of $20. The benefit to the seller
for breaching the contract is the incremental increase in profit of $30. Assume
that the original buyer could have earned $110 from the machine. Breach will
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model.14 Under this justification, forcible abduction is optimal in a scena-
rio where the terrorist threat is imminent, the opportunity for abduction is
fleeting, the target nation is unwilling to extradite or prosecute, the interna-
tional community is gridlocked, the territorial infringement is reasonably
limited, the operation involves minimal threat to bystanders, and the
accused receives humane treatment and a fair trial.' 5
The theory of efficient breach justifies self-help and takes into account
both a country's need to protect its nationals as well as the self-defense
justification. Self-help benefits the international community by removing
serious threats from circulation, deterring terrorist travel and therefore ter-
rorist activity, and breaking international stalemates. So justified, forcible
abductions are less susceptible to charges of lawlessness or the arbitrary
exercise of self-defense. Indeed, an analysis of historical examples bears
out that the practice is subject to both self-regulation and international reg-
ulation, including the assessment of damages, which help to ensure that
states will engage in self-help only where the benefits exceed the costs. 1 6
International actors and institutions should recognize these efficiencies
and therefore should encourage breach where preconditions are satisfied
and assess appropriate damages for nonperformance of custom or treaty.
On the strength of this justification, forcible abduction, as a means of self-
help, is a legitimate counterterrorist measure in a post-September 11th
world.
Part I of this Note presents the jurisdictional issues in international
law relevant to self-help and provides an overview of states' approaches to
forcible abduction. Part II discusses the contours of the efficient breach
justification and then applies the model to historical cases of state-author-
ized abduction. Part III examines the outer bounds of the justification and
addresses some potential counterarguments. This Note concludes by pro-
posing that self-help would be an appropriate and justifiable response to
the introductory hypothetical. Ultimately, the theory of efficient breach
justifies forcible abduction as a method of combating terrorism when
existing methods of international resolution have failed.
cause the original buyer to lose the $110 benefit of owning the machine. But
because the original buyer will not have to pay the $100 purchase price, the
original buyer's net loss resulting from the breach is $10. Under contract law,
the seller would pay $10 to the original buyer in damages (assuming a replace-
ment machine cannot be found at the contract price). Because the seller can
gain $30, the seller will breach the contract and pay the $10 in damages and still
be $20 better off. No party is worse off.
Id. at 185 n.4.
14. For a discussion of efficient breach in the international law context see Dunoff
& Trachtman, supra note 13.
15. See discussion infra Part II.A.
16. See discussion infra Part I.A-B.
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I. International Law and State Practice
A. Defining Terrorism and the Bases of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction
The initial problems in any discussion involving terrorism are defini-
tional. Who qualifies as a state actor? What constitutes an armed attack?
How does one determine whether the act is political? 17 While these are
critical questions, for the purposes of this Note, the term terrorism shall
refer to acts currently recognized as criminal under international law and
with a nonstate bin Laden-type figure as the offender. With the notable
exceptions of the Eichmann' 8 and the Noriega abductions,19 forcible
abductions usually target nonstate actors who have engaged in or planned
specific incidents of terrorism. 20 Moreover, as the discussion of Yunis 2
1
17. It is a cliche that one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter. Professor
Mallison summarizes the problem of defining these terms: "Terror and terrorism are not
words which refer to a well-defined and clearly identified set of factual events. Neither
do the words have any widely accepted meaning in legal doctrine. Terror and terror-
ism ... do not refer to a unitary concept in either law or fact." W.T. Mallison & S.V.
Mallison, The Concept of Public Purpose Terror in International Law: Doctrines and Sanc-
tions to Reduce the Destruction of Human and Material Values, 18 How. LJ. 12, 12 (1974).
The U.S. Department of State defines terrorism as "premeditated, politically motivated
violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine
agents, usually intended to influence an audience." COORDINATOR FOR COUNTERTERROR-
IsM, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PUB. No. 10610, PATTERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM 1998 (1999).
In the United Nations Charter, terrorism is defined thus: "[I]nternational terrorism...
endangers or takes innocent human lives or jeopardizes fundamental freedoms .... and
is caused by misery, frustration, grievance and despair, which cause some people to
sacrifice human lives, including their own, in an attempt to effect radical changes." G.A.
Res. 3034, U.N. GAOR, 27th Sess., Supp. No. 30, at 19, U.N. Doc. A/8730 (1972). For
some of the voluminous discussion on the definition of terrorism see Emanuel Gross,
Legal Aspects of Tackling Terrorism: The Balance Between the Right of a Democracy to
Defend Itself and the Protection of Human Rights, 6 UCLAJ. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 89,
97-101 (2001); Michael P. Scharf, Defining Terrorism as the Peace Time Equivalent of War
Crimes: A Case of Too Much Convergence Between International Humanitarian Law and
International Criminal Law, 7 ILSAJ. INT'L & COMp. L. 391, 391-98 (2001); W. Michael
Reisman, International Legal Responses to Terrorism, 22 Hous. J. INT'L L. 3, 9-30 (1999);
Louis Rend Beres, The Legal Meaning of Terrorism for the Military Commander, 11 CONN.
J. INT'L L. 1 (1995); and Guy Roberts, Self-Help in Combating State-Sponsored Terrorism:
Self-Defense and Peacetime Reprisals, 19 CAse W. RES. J. INT'L L. 243, 248-53 (1987). See
also U.N. SCOR 56th Sess., 4385th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/Res/1373 (2001) (prohibiting
direct and indirect support of terrorists, such as by providing safe havens or allowing
funds or other resources to flow to terrorists, terrorist-owned or -controlled entities, or
persons acting on behalf of terrorists).
18. See discussion infra Part I.C.2.
19. On January 3, 1990, General Manuel Noriega surrendered to U.S. troops, who
had invaded Panama, and was subsequently turned over by them to U.S. drug enforce-
ment agents. See Beverly Izes, Drawing Lines in the Sand: When State-Sanctioned Abduc-
tions of War Criminals Should Be Permitted, 31 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 1, 14, 30-34
(1997) (calling for international legal approval of state-sanctioned abductions of war
crime suspects and discussing in detail Noriega's abduction and his subsequent trial in
the United States); see also Christopher A. Donesa, Note, Protecting National Interests:
The Legal Status of Extraterritorial Law Enforcement by the Military, 41 DUKE L.J. 867,
901 (1992) (discussing Noriega's abduction).
20. See generally Beck & Arend, supra note 5, at 218 (concluding that terrorists and
terrorist-sponsoring states are two permissible targets for a self-defense response and
discussing the circumstances in which that response would be permissible).
21. See discussion infra Part I.C.1.
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later indicates, the practice of self-help may be assessed by focusing on the
defendant's actions rather than his intentions or the political ramifications
of the act. 22 Focusing on acts condemned by treaty or convention and on
actors associated with nonstate groups allows for an assessment of forcible
abduction as a self-help measure that is tangible and that addresses ramifi-
cations and criticisms, but does not require a reconceptualization of the
entire subject.
International law pertaining to forcible abduction covers limits on
state action, the nature of universally condemned crimes, and the princi-
ples under which a state may assert jurisdiction over an offender. Article
2(4) of the United Nations (UN) Charter prohibits member states as well as
non-member states from threatening to use or actually using force against
the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any
other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.23 Fur-
ther, Article 2(3) of the Charter prohibits behavior that jeopardizes interna-
tional peace and security.24 However, Article 51 of the Charter does allow
for necessary and proportional acts of self-defense, stating that "nothing in
the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collec-
tive self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United
Nations."'25 Apart from this limited exception, international law is gener-
ally thought to prohibit incursions on the territorial sovereignty of another
state.
26
States seeking to capture, extradite, 27 or prosecute terrorists or other
22. Wegner, supra note 6, at 437-38. Discussion of definitional issues relating to
terrorism could expand beyond the limits of this exercise; indeed, other articles are
devoted entirely to this topic. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. Therefore, the
term is here limited in order to facilitate broader discussion of forcible abduction as a
practice.
23. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.
24. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 3.
25. U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
26. L. OPPENHEIM, 1 INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE 295 n.1 (H. Lauterpacht 8th ed.,
1955); see also Bill to Authorize Prosecution of Terrorists and Others Who Attack U.S. Gov-
ernment Employees and Citizens Abroad: Hearing on S. 1373, S. 1429 & S. 1508 Before the
Subcomm. on Security and Terrorism of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st
Sess. 63 (1985) (statement by Abraham Sofaer, Legal Adviser to the State Department).
When questioned at a congressional hearing, Sofaer resisted the notion that such
seizures were acceptable:
Can you imagine us going into Paris and seizing some person we regard as a
terrorist ... ? [H]ow would we feel if some foreign nation-let us take the United
Kingdom-came over here and seized some terrorist suspect in New York City,
or Boston, or Philadelphia .... because we refused through the normal channels
of international, legal communications, to extradite that individual?
Id.
27. When states succeed in extraditing a criminal defendant, it is usually under a
bilateral treaty with the state in which the defendant is located. See Elizabeth Chien,
United States v. Humberto Alvarez-Machain: Government-Sponsored International Kid-
napping as an Alternative to Extradition?, 15 U. HAw. L. REv. 179, 184-185 (1993). In
fact, "extradition is the only regular system devised to restore fugitive criminals to the
jurisdiction of a court competent by municipal and international law to try them." See
IvAN A. SHEARER, EXTRADITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 67 (1971). Although many states
extradite pursuant to a treaty, customary international law does not require a formal
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international criminals must first demonstrate an appropriate connection
to the crime before establishing jurisdiction. 28  According to the 1935
Harvard Research Draft,29 there are five generally accepted principles
empowering a nation to exercise jurisdiction over crimes perpetrated extra-
territorially: (1) territorial jurisdiction based on the place where the
offense occured; (2) national jurisdiction arising from the offender's
nationality; (3) protective jurisdiction based on injury to national interest;
(4) universal jurisdiction, which covers crimes that are so universally con-
demned that jurisdiction is conferred upon any nation that obtains cus-
tody over the offender regardless of the nationality of the accused or the
victims; and (5) passive personality jurisdiction based on the nationality of
the victim. 30 The passive personality principle enables a country to extend
its jurisdiction to offenses committed by individuals in foreign territories if
the victim is one of the country's nationals.3 1 The principle is premised on
a state's duty to protect its nationals abroad and is concerned with the
effect of the crime as opposed to its situs. 3 2
How then have states engaging in forcible abductions applied these
principles? The United States has traditionally relied only on universal
jurisdiction, but recently, also on passive personality jurisdiction.3 3 Uni-
versal jurisdiction does not require an actual nexus between the state pros-
ecuting the alleged crime and the state where the offense occurred; the
prosecuting state only needs to show that the crime is universally con-
demned.3 4 Universal jurisdiction initially developed under customary law
to cover the crime of piracy but has expanded to encompass additional
offenses and is now largely covered by treaties.35 For example, the Restate-
ment (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States recognizes uni-
versal jurisdiction over the offenses of piracy, attacks on or hijacking of
aircrafts, genocide, war crimes, slave trade, and perhaps certain acts of ter-
extradition. Therefore, where a state has no formal extradition agreement with another
state, and the latter refuses to extradite the fugitive voluntarily, forcible abduction is an
alternative means.
28. Research in International Law, Draft Convention on Jurisdiction with Respect to
Crime, 29 AM. J. INT'L L. 437, 573 (Supp. 1935) [hereinafter Harvard Research Draft].
"Jurisdiction to prescribe" is a state's authority to promulgate law applicable to persons
or activities. "Jurisdiction to adjudicate" refers to the authority of a state to subject per-
sons or things to its judicial power. Lastly, "jurisdiction to enforce" concerns a state's
authority to compel compliance with its law. See JEFFREY L. DUNOFF ET AL., INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW: NoRMs, ACTORS, PROCESS 329-30 (2002).
29. See Harvard Research Draft, supra note 28.
30. See Dunoff & Trachtman, supra note 13, at 123; Abramovsky, supra note 3, at
123; Wegner, supra note 6, at 417.
31. Harvard Research Draft, supra note 28, at 445.
32. See John G. McCarthy, Note, The Passive Personality Principle and Its Use in Com-
bating International Terrorism, 13 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 298, 300-02 (1989-1990).
33. See discussion infra Part I.C.1.
34. Wegner, supra note 6, at 421. For a comprehensive analysis of universal jurisdic-
tion, see generally Jon B. Jordan, Universal Jurisdiction in a Dangerous World: A Weapon
for All Against International Crime, 9 MICH. ST. U. DETROIT C.L.J. INT'L L. 1 (2000).
35. Wegner, supra note 6, at 421-23.
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rorism.3 6 Furthermore, a number of significant conventions, including
those noted below, universally condemn terrorist activities and outline
principles of enforcement, although it must be said that some States Parties
have expressed reservations or accepted terms only on a limited basis.
3 7
The United States has not been entirely consistent in its policy towards
universal jurisdiction. In pursuing the war on terror, the Bush Administra-
tion has engaged in what one commentator terms "unilateral multilateral-
ism" -supporting international institutions that advance U.S. interests
while actively discouraging or restraining other states from asserting extra-
territorial jurisdiction.38 For example, the Bush Administration has
objected to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
("ICC"), 39 fearing that Article 12 could allow the ICC to exercise jurisdic-
tion over nationals of nonparty states such as the United States, thereby
potentially exposing U.S. military personnelito prosecution.40 In addition
to passing domestic legislation that restricts cooperation with the ICC,
4 1
the United States has pressured States Parties to sign Article 98 agree-
ments, pursuant to which each country agrees not to surrender a U.S.
national to the ICC should the court make such a request. 4 2 Furthermore,
the Bush Administration pressured Belgium into amending its domestic
human rights law that had provided for universal jurisdiction after com-
plaints were filed against the President and General Tommy Franks in April
2003, calling for a war crimes investigation. 43 Yet, as evidenced by the
36. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 404
(1987).
37. Id.
38. See Diane F. Orentlicher, Unilateral Multilateralism: United States Policy Toward
the International Criminal Court, 36 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 415, 416 (2003).
39. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, U.N. Doc. A/
CONF.183/9 (1998), reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 999, available at http://www.un.org/law/
icc/statute/english/rome-statute(e).pdf [hereinafter Rome Statute]. Although President
Clinton made the United States a signatory to the Rome Statute, the Bush Administra-
tion subsequently informed the United Nations that the United States no longer
intended to become a party. See David J. Scheffer, Staying the Course with the Interna-
tional Criminal Court, 35 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 47, 63-64 (2002). Notably, while the Rome
Statute confers jurisdiction over genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, it
does not directly address terrorism. See Rome Statute, supra.
40. See Orentlicher, supra note 38, at 419. Article 12 limits the ICC to assertion of
jurisdiction for crimes committed (a) on the territory of a state that is a party to the
Rome Statute, or (b) where the state of which the accused is a national is a party to the
Rome Statute. See Rome Statute, supra note 39, art. 12.
41. American Servicemembers' Protection Act of 2002, 22 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7433
(2002).
42. See Colum Lynch, U.S. Confronts EU on War Crimes Immunity Pact, WASH. POST,
June 10, 2003, at A17. Article 98(2) of the Rome Statute prevents the Court from
requesting the surrender of a suspect when such surrender would conflict with other
international agreements, such as status of forces agreements, which require host states
of military forces to obtain the cooperation of the sending state before surrendering a
suspect to the ICC. See Rome Statute, supra note 39, art. 98(2); see also Orentlicher,
supra note 38, at 423.
43. See Belgium Moves to Limit War Crimes Law, Repair U.S. Ties, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 2,
2003, at A6. In 1993, Belgium enacted a law allowing any person to file a criminal
complaint against any other person in a Belgian court provided only that the plaintiff
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Solicitor General's position with respect to the Alvarez-Machain abduction,
noted above, the Bush Administration's "unilateral multilateralism" does
not appear to preclude the United States from endorsing universal jurisdic-
tion where the abduction of terrorists is concerned.
Since the United States has traditionally refrained from prosecuting
foreign nationals for conduct occurring wholly outside the United States,
the passive personality principle has been the basis least relied upon for
assertions of extraterritorial jurisdiction.4 4 It has also been the most heav-
ily criticized-in part because it confers authority on a state simply
because its nationals were victims of an attack, even if they were not the
intended targets and even if the attack occurred in a foreign country. 45
However, the passive personality principle has arguably become a tool for
the executive to assert jurisdiction in domestic courts. For example, in
United States v. Benitez,4 6 a case involving conspiracy charges against a
Colombian national to murder U.S. drug enforcement agents engaged in
the performance of official duties, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that
Congress intended a victim's nationality to serve as a sufficient predicate
allege a violation of an international human right that is guaranteed by certain enumer-
ated international conventions. Loi du 16 juin 1993 relative i la repression des infrac-
tions graves aux Conventions internationales de Genve du 12 aofit 1949 et aux
Protocoles I et II du 8 juin 1977 [Law of the 16th of June 1993 Concerning Punishment
for Grave Breaches of the Geneva Conventions], Moniteur Beige, Aug. 5, 1993, at 17751
(BeIg.) amended by and renamed to Loi relative A la repression des violations graves de
droit international humanitaire [Law Concerning the Punishment for Grave Breaches of
International Humanitarian Law], Moniteur Beige, Mar. 23, 1999, at 9286 (BeIg.), trans-
lated in 38 I.L.M. 918 (1999). The law did not require that the plaintiff or the defendant
be a resident or a citizen of Belgium, or that the crime have occurred in Belgium. Id.
Although on its face, the law appears to allow almost any plaintiff to seek redress for
violations of any one of a broad range of human rights violations, only four persons
were tried and convicted pursuant to it: four Rwandans were sentenced to prison terms
between twelve and twenty years for committing genocide. Keith B. Richburg, Rwandan
Nuns Jailed in Genocide, Jury Sentences Also Two Others, WASH. PosT,June 9, 2001, at Al.
In response to pressure from the United States, the Belgian legislature limited the broad
sweep of the statute to passive personality jurisdiction in two steps: First, in April 2003
the legislature amended the law to give Belgian prosecutors complete discretion not to
prosecute criminal complaints that are unrelated to Belgium. Further, in response to the
complaints that had been filed in Belgian courts against several foreign leaders, includ-
ing President Bush, the legislature also provided that prosecutors should refrain from
prosecuting a complaint where prosecution might show a lack of respect for Belgium's
international obligations. In June 2003, the legislature replaced the 1993 law with one
far more limited in scope: Pursuant to the new law, Belgian courts will exercise jurisdic-
tion over criminal complaints of human rights violations only where the suspect or the
victim is a Belgian national or resident. Further, the prosecutor retains the discretion
not to prosecute a complaint where respect for Belgium's international obligations
requires. See Fiona McKay, U.S. Unilateralism and International Crimes: The Interna-
tional Criminal Court and Terrorism, 36 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 455, 459 n.18 (2003).
44. Abramovsky, supra note 3, at 123-24.
45. McCarthy, supra note 32, at 301 ("The passive personality principle is the most
controversial of the five accepted bases of jurisdiction in international law."); see also
Christopher L. Blakesley, A Conceptual Framework for Extradition and Jurisdiction over
Extraterritorial Crimes, 1984 UTAH L. REv. 685, 715 (1984) (stating that the passive
personality theory of jurisdiction is "generally considered to be anathematic to United
States law").
46. United States v. Benitez, 741 F.2d 1312 (11th Cir. 1984).
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for assertion of jurisdiction if the victim was a U.S. government official. 47
Additionally, many states including Germany, Israel, Italy, Mexico, Japan,
Turkey, and France have incorporated passive personality jurisdiction into
their domestic criminal statutes to cover offenses committed against their
nationals while traveling or living abroad.
48
B. Establishing an International Prohibition of the Alleged Offense
In addition to proper jurisdiction, a state seeking to justify abduction
and prosecution should demonstrate that the alleged offense is prohibited
by international agreement or custom.4 9 Consider the hijackings of Sep-
tember 11, 2001,50 or the hostage-taking at the 1972 Olympics in
Munich. 5 1 Both of these terrorist acts are prohibited by several treaties.
Hijackings are prohibited by the 1963 Convention on Certain Offenses and
Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft 52 (Tokyo Convention),
the 1970 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft 53
(Hijacking) (Hague Convention), and the 1971 Convention for the Suppres-
47. Id. at 1316; see also Abramovsky, supra note 3, at 126. The Eleventh Circuit
concluded that the district court's authority to try Benitez arose from both the protective
principle and the passive personality principle. Benitez, 741 F.2d at 1317. The circuit
court relied almost exclusively on the protective principle, citing the threat to U.S. inter-
ests created by Benitez's actions. Id.; see also Abramovsky, supra note 3, at 126. Thus,
the Eleventh Circuit avoided the issue of whether the passive personality principle is a
sufficient basis for jurisdiction. Id. at 126; see also United States v. Columba-Colella,
604 F.2d 356 (5th Cir. 1979) (denying that the passive personality principle is sufficient
by itself to create jurisdiction).
48. See Wegner, supra note 6, at 429.
49. Universal jurisdiction requires such a demonstration. See infra. While states
have offered domestic legislation with extraterritorial reach as a justification for extra-
territorial law enforcement, a state seeking to take the drastic action of forcibly abduct-
ing an individual from the territory of another state would do well to show international
condemnation of the alleged offense to buttress its case.
50. On September 11, 2001, terrorists linked to Osama bin Laden's al Qaeda organi-
zation hijacked four California-bound airliners. Two planes crashed into the World
Trade Center in New York City, causing both towers to collapse. The third plane
originating at Dulles Airport crashed into the Pentagon. The final plane crashed some
eighty miles outside of Pittsburgh after passengers rushed the cockpit. See Michael
Grunwald, Terrorists Hijack 4 Airliners, Destroy World Trade Center, Hit Pentagon; Hun-
dreds Dead; Bush Promises Retribution; Military Put on Highest Alert, WASH. POST, Sept.
12, 2001, at Al.
51. At the 1972 Olympic Games in Munich, five members of the terrorist group
"Black September" captured nine Israeli athletes and held them hostage after killing two
others. The group was formed in September 1970 by Fatah, the military arm of the
Palestine Liberation Organization, after King Hussein turned his army against the Pales-
tinian groups in Jordan, driving them into exile. The terrorists demanded the release of
200 Palestinian prisoners jailed in Israel. All nine hostages and five terrorists were later
killed in a rescue attempt by the West German police. See David Binder, Nine Israelis on
Olympic Team Killed with Four Arab Captors as Police Fight Band that Disrupted Munich
Games: A Twenty Three Hour Drama: Two Others Are Slain in Their Quarters in Guerrilla
Raid, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 1972, at Al.
52. Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft,
Sept. 14, 1963, 20 U.S.T. 2941, 704 U.N.T.S. 219.
53. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Dec. 16, 1970,
22 U.S.T. 1641, 860 U.N.T.S. 105.
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sion of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation 54 (Sabotage)
(Montreal Convention). The 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas
(Geneva Convention) 5 5 and the Convention for the Suppression of Unlaw-
ful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation 56 outlaw the related
offense of piracy. Hostage-taking is prohibited by the 1979 International
Convention Against the Taking of Hostages. 5 7 Other international agree-
ments apply to both hijackings and hostage-takings: The 1971 Organiza-
tion of American States Convention on Terrorism 58 and the 1977
European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism 5 9 condemn aircraft
piracy as well as hostage-taking, and thus would prohibit acts such as the
September 11 hijackings and the Munich hostage-taking. In addition, the
1998 International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bomb-
ings60 provides that signatory states enact legislation prohibiting individu-
als from placing, discharging, or detonating an explosive in a place of
public use.6 1
Furthermore, the Hague and Montreal Conventions, but not the Tokyo
Convention, include clauses that require signatory states to establish juris-
diction where the alleged offender is present in their territory.6 2 The
Hague and Montreal Conventions, as well as the Convention Against the
Taking of Hostages and the Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist
Bombings, require participating states to prosecute offenders found within
their borders if that state elects not to extradite the accused. 63 This man-
date is relevant to forcible abduction because states are often motivated to
exercise self-help when their counterparts refuse to prosecute or extradite
terrorists found within their borders. 64
In the absence of a treaty or Security Council Resolution, there is no
international legal obligation to extradite or to prosecute in default of extra-
dition.65 Finally, recent Security Council action, particularly Resolution
54. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Avia-
tion, Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 564, 974 U.N.T.S. 177.
55. Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, 12 U.S.T. 2312, 450 U.N.T.S. 82.
56. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime
Navigation, Mar. 10, 1988, 27 I.L.M. 668.
57. International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, Dec. 17, 1979, T.I.A.S.
No. 11,081, 1316 U.N.T.S. 205.
58. Convention to Prevent and Punish Acts of Terrorism Taking the Form of Crimes
Against Persons and Related Extortion that Are of International Significance, Feb. 2,
1971, 27 U.S.T. 3949, 1986 U.N.T.S. 195.
59. European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, Jan. 27, 1977, 1137
U.N.T.S. 93.
60. International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, supra note 57.
61. International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, Dec. 15,
1997, 37 I.L.M. 249.
62. See Wegner, supra note 6, at 423.
63. See id. (discussing the duty of signatory states under the Hague and Montreal
Conventions); International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, art. 8(1), supra
note 60, at 207; European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, art. 6(1), supra
note 59, at 94.
64. See discussion infra Part II.A.
65. See Omer Y. Elagab, The Hague as the Seat of the Lockerbie Trial: Some Constraints,
34 INT'L LAw 289, 300 (2000). The U.S. government confronted this issue when the
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1373-which appears to deny terrorist-sponsoring states the ability to pros-
ecute their nationals domestically-suggests there may be an emerging
trend that could justify abduction even in the absence of a convention.6 6
C. Analyzing the Judicial Response to Forcible Abduction
1. United States: From Ker-Frisbie and Toscanino to Yunis and Alvarez-
Machain
The United States grounds its support for forcible abduction on judi-
cial decisions rather than on legislative acts. Judicial sanctioning of forci-
ble abduction finds its genesis in the Ker-Frisbie doctrine. In Ker v.
Illinois,67 an Illinois court sought extradition of Ker, a U.S. citizen residing
in Peru, on state charges of larceny and embezzlement. 6 8 President
Chester A. Arthur directed an agent to contact the Peruvian authorities and
to transmit a request for extradition. 69 Peru was in a state of war with
Chile, however, making it impossible for the agent to locate any authorities;
therefore, the agent requested permission from the Chilean general leading
the occupation of Peru to extradite Ker.70 The general assented and com-
missioned an officer to help the agent, who forcibly arrested Ker and
brought him to the United States to stand trial. 71 Ker challenged the juris-
diction of the U.S. court, arguing that his abduction violated the extradi-
tion treaty between the United States and Mexico. 72 However, the Supreme
Court concluded that although the United States did not pursue arrest
under the extradition treaty, failure to resort to its provisions did not con-
stitute a violation of the treaty and did not require denial of jurisdiction.73
The Court reasoned that "mere irregularities in the manner in which he
may be brought into the custody of the law" do not operate to prevent
Libyan government refused to extradite two Libyan intelligence officers whom the U.S.
had indicted for the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland in Decem-
ber 1988. See, e.g., Christopher C. Joyner & Wayne P. Rothbaum, Libya and the Aerial
Incident at Lockerbie: What Lessons for International Extradition Law?, 14 MICH. J. INT'L
L. 222 (1993) (examining the shortcomings of the international extradition process and
addressing whether the U.N. Security Council's imposition of sanctions against Libya
for its failure to comply with the Security Council's requests for cooperation in the inter-
national investigation of the Lockerbie incident could be an effective measure for bring-
ing terrorists to justice).
66. Jonathan A. Frank, A Return to Lockerbie and the Montreal Convention in the Wake
of the September 11 th Terrorist Attacks: Ramifications of Past Security Council and Interna-
tional Court of Justice Action, 30 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 532, 543-45 (2002) (sug-
gesting that post-September l1th Security Council action establishes precedent for
forcible abduction, bypassing the conventions in place, as well as the principle of state
sovereignty).
67. Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1866).
68. Id. at 437-38.
69. See id. at 438.
70. See id.
71. Charles Fairman, Comment, Ker v. Illinois Revisited, 47 Am. J. INT'L L. 678,
684-85 (1953).
72. Ker, 119 U.S. at 437.
73. Abraham Abramovsky, Extraterritorial Abductions: America's "Catch and Snatch"
Policy Run Amok, 31 VA. J. INT'L L. 151, 157 (1991).
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indictment.74
The Supreme Court faced a similar jurisdictional issue in Frisbie v.
Collins.75 In Frisbie, the Court addressed whether the Michigan police con-
travened the Federal Kidnapping Act by forcibly transporting Shirley Col-
lins from Illinois to Michigan to stand trial for murder.76 In reaffirming
Ker and rejecting Collins's claim that her abduction and subsequent con-
viction violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and
the Federal Kidnapping Act, 77 the Court concluded that forcible abduc-
tions do not impair the power of a court to try a person for a crime.
78
Despite the unusual factual circumstances in Ker,79 over time the two cases
have come to stand for a judicial sanction of the policy of forcible
abduction.80
Although the Ker-Frisbie doctrine carves out expansive authority for
engaging in extraterritorial abductions, it is not without judicially imposed
limitations: In United States v. Toscanino, for example, 8 1 the Second Circuit
noted that a more expanded notion of due process had developed since
Ker-Frisbie, and therefore a court should divest itself of jurisdiction where
law enforcement authorities had utilized methods that shock the con-
science or had engaged in a "deliberate, unnecessary and unreasonable
invasion of the accused's constitutional rights" to effect the abduction.
82
In Toscanino, the Uruguayan police, on the urging of the United States,
abducted an Italian national from his home in Montevideo and delivered
him to U.S. authorities at the Brazilian border.8 3 Once in U.S. custody,
U.S. law enforcement officials subjected Toscanino to various degrada-
tions, including denying him sleep and nourishment, forcing him to walk
up and down a hallway for seven hours, flushing his eyes and nose with
alcohol, and electrocuting him through his ears, toes, and genitals.
84
Toscanino represents an abducting state's self-imposed regulation. 85
The notion of self-imposed regulation buttresses both the traditional justifi-
cations for self-help-protecting citizens and self-defense-and the efficient
breach arguments because regulation of law enforcement officials by the
74. Ker, 119 U.S. at 440.
75. Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952).
76. Id. at 520-22.
77. Id. at 522.
78. Id.
79. See Brigette Belton Homrig, Comment, Abduction as an Alternative to Extradi-
tion- A Dangerous Method to Obtain Jurisdiction Over Criminal Defendants, 28 WAKE FOR-
EST L. REv. 671, 680 (1993) (indicating that commentators have described Ker as an
anomaly given that Peru never protested the abduction and that arguably Peru's territo-
rial sovereignty was never violated since Chilean forces controlled Peru at the time of the
abduction).
80. Abramovsky, supra note 73, at 157-58.
81. United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974).
82. Id. at 275.
83. Id. at 269-70; Abramovsky, supra note 73, at 158.
84. Abramovsky, supra note 73, at 158.
85. See Michell, supra note 5, at 400-04. But see Abramovsky, supra note 73, at 160
(stating that the reluctance of courts to invoke the Toscanino exception renders it virtu-
ally meaningless).
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domestic courts assures the international community that the accused will
receive humane treatment. 8 6
Relying upon Ker-Frisbie as a foundation, two leading cases define
modern U.S. judicial policy: United States v. Yunis 87 and United States v.
Alvarez-Machain.8 8 Yunis arose out of the following facts: On June 11,
1985, Lebanese national Fawaz Yunis and four other members of the Leba-
nese Amal Militia hijacked a Royal Jordanian airliner at the Beirut Interna-
tional Airport, taking hostage more than fifty passengers, including two
Americans.8 9 The group, armed with assault rifles and hand grenades,
directed the pilot to fly to Tunis, Tunisia, where a conference of the Arab
League was in progress. 90 Nearly a day and a half later, after the plane had
landed, refueled in Cyprus and Italy, and attempted without success to
land in Tunisia and Syria, Yunis forced the plane to return to Beirut.9 1
After the plane landed, the hostages were released, and the hijackers held a
press conference, in which Yunis delivered an address originally intended
for the Arab conference in Tunis. 9 2 Following the speech, the hijackers
blew up the aircraft and disappeared into the streets of Beirut. 9 3 In Sep-
tember 1987, the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") commenced
Operation Goldenrod in response to the hijacking. 94 The FBI lured Yunis
onto a yacht in the eastern Mediterranean Sea by promising him a lucrative
drug deal. The agents then directed the ship into international waters
where they arrested Yunis and charged him with the hijacking of the Royal
Jordanian airliner. 95
The circuit court in Yunis first turned to the question of jurisdiction.96
Although Judge Mikva explained that "[the court's] duty is to enforce the
Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States, not to conform the law
of the land to norms of customary international law,"97 the court affirmed
the district court's reasoning that universal jurisdiction is appropriate for
the crimes of aircraft piracy and hostage-taking given the treaties discussed
above, the Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law, and legal scholar-
ship.98 The district court had relied on these declarations as evidence that
the international community held a strong commitment to punish hijack-
ers in its holding that universal jurisdiction was warranted. 99
The circuit court in Yunis also upheld the district court's reliance on
86. But see Abramovsky, supra note 73, at 203 (expressing concern for the lack of
boundaries and the potential for ad hoc decisions in U.S. abduction policy).
87. United States v. Yunis, 924 F.2d 1086 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
88. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992).
89. Yunis, 924 F.2d at 1089; see also Wegner, supra note 6, at 421.
90. United States v. Yunis, 681 F.Supp. 896, 899 (D.D.C. 1988).
91. Id. at 899.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Yunis, 924 F.2d at 1089.
95. Id. at 1089; United States v. Yunis, 859 F.2d 953, 955 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
96. Yunis, 924 F.2d at 1090.
97. Id. at 1091.
98. Id. at 1092.
99. Yunis, 681 F.Supp. at 901.
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the passive personality principle as a basis for jurisdiction. 10 0 The govern-
ment asserted that because U.S. citizens were among the hostages, passive
personality jurisdiction was appropriate, while Yunis contended that inter-
national and domestic law frowned upon the principle. 1 1 The district
court, however, concluded that the principle was both viable and applica-
ble,10 2 citing Benitez, the Restatement of Foreign Relations, the Achille-
Lauro affair, 10 3 and the latitude provided by relevant conventions and
treaties. 104
Next, the circuit court turned to the question of whether the domestic
statute empowered the court to try an individual who had been forcibly
abducted. Judge Mikva concluded that Congress intended the language of
the Destruction of Aircraft Act, 10 5 which states that punishment applies to
hijackers later "found in the United States," to parallel the Hague Conven-
tion's "present in [a contracting state's] territory" language. 10 6 Further-
more, Congress enacted the statute to fulfill U.S. responsibilities under the
Convention, and given that it understood the Convention as having
expressed no reservations regarding how the accused had come within U.S.
territory, the court concluded, consistent with Ker, that assertion of federal
jurisdiction was proper.10 7 Lastly, the court rejected Yunis's assertion
that, under Toscanino, it should decline to exercise jurisdiction. 10 8 The
court reasoned that, while the government's conduct was not a model for
law enforcement behavior-for instance, fracturing Yunis's wrists while
subduing him-the discomfort experienced by the accused did not suffi-
ciently shock the conscience to divest the court of jurisdiction. 10 9
In United States v. Alvarez-Machain,1 10 U.S. government agents forci-
bly abducted a Mexican national from Mexico in connection with charges
of kidnapping, torturing, and murdering an undercover U.S. drug enforce-
ment agent."'I Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, consid-
ered two central issues: first, whether a court could try a criminal brought
before it in violation of an extradition treaty; and second, whether a defen-
dant could challenge the court's jurisdiction where his presence had been
100. Id. at 903.
101. Id. at 901-02.
102. Id. at 902-03, afJ'd Yunis, 924 F.2d 1086, 1092.
103. The Achille-Lauro affair is discussed infra Part I.B.
104. Act for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Hostage Taking, 18
U.S.C. § 1203(a) (1988) (applicable to persons committing acts against U.S. citizens
where the only connection to the United States is the nationality of the victim); Omnibus
Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act (Antiterrorism Act), 18 U.S.C. § 2331 (1988)
(same). For discussion of the reach of the Antiterrorism Act, see Patrick L. Donnelly,
Note, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Over Acts of Terrorism Committed Abroad: Omnibus
Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 599 (1987).
105. Destruction of Aircraft Act, 18 U.S.C. § 32 (1988).
106. Yunis, 924 F.2d at 1091-92.
107. Id. at 1092.
108. Id. at 1093.
109. Id. at 1092-93.
110. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. at 655.
111. Id. at 657; Michell, supra note 5, at 404.
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secured through forcible abduction. 112
The majority concluded that no violation of the U.S.-Mexico Extradi-
tion Treaty had occurred and that Ker therefore controlled.'1 3 According
to the majority, the treaty's silence on the contracting parties' obligation to
refrain from forcible abductions indicated that the parties did not intend to
prohibit such conduct. 114 The majority noted that the treaty did not cover
the entire universe of U.S.-Mexico relations and that it therefore did not
explicitly bar abductions occurring outside of its terms." 5 Rehnquist rea-
soned that since Mexico was aware of the Ker-Frisbie doctrine and had not
contracted around it, it had implicitly acceded to the U.S. interpretation of
the treaty that allowed abductions. 116 In dispensing with the jurisdictional
challenge, the majority concluded that because Alvarez-Machain had con-
ceded that his rights under the treaty were derivative of Mexico, and
because Mexico had not asserted a violation of the treaty, Alvarez-Machain
could not argue that the treaty conferred procedural protections directly
upon citizens of contracting states.117
Considered against the background of Ker-Frisbie, Yunis and Alvarez-
Machain suggest consistent U.S. judicial authorization for forcible abduc-
tion. That is, U.S. courts pay little heed to how presence in the United
States was secured as long as the accused does not suffer outrageous
abuse, view terrorism as a universally condemned crime, and find jurisdic-
tion where the offenses victimized U.S. citizens. Yunis suggests that courts
will read domestic legislation to cover defendants who were brought before
the court by abduction and will conclude that such legislation is in accord
with international conventions. Alvarez-Machain, moreover, stands for the
proposition that extradition treaties that do not explicitly prohibit abduc-
tion will not act as a bar to the practice and further suggests that defend-
ants lack standing to claim a violation of due process that is based on a
state's failure to extradite under the provisions of an existing treaty.
112. See Michell, supra note 5, at 405; see also Abramovsky, supra note 73, at 195-201
(discussing the development of U.S. law on abduction and examining the 1976 Mansfeld
Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, which prohibited federal agents from
participating in arrests in foreign countries).
113. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. at 662. While on its facts Ker was distinguishable as a
case involving private abduction-though with government assent-the majority never-
theless treated it as binding precedent. See id.
114. Id. at 663-65.
115. In United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 430 (1886), the Court found that the
doctrine of specialty-according to which an extradited person can only be tried on a
charge for which the person was extradited-should be read into the treaty in question
and that, so read, the treaty barred the arrest or trial of Rauscher for other offenses
"until a reasonable time and opportunity [had] been given him ... to return to the
country from whose asylum he had been forcibly taken . I..." ld. In Alvarez-Machain,
however, the Court sidestepped the Rauscher exception, found no violation of the Mexi-
can-American extradition treaty, and asserted jurisdiction over Alvarez-Machain. See
Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. at 658-60; see also Wilske & Schiller, supra note 8, at 210.
116. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. at 665.
117. Extradition Treaty Between the United States of America and the United Mexican
States, May 4, 1978, U.S.-Mex., 31 U.S.T. 5059 (entered into force Jan. 25, 1980); see also
Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. at 667-669 (implying that an individual's rights under a
treaty are derivative of a state's rights).
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Despite judicial backing, official government reaction to forcible
abductions has sometimes appeared inconsistent with its practice. Most
notably, the United States has condemned Israeli self-help efforts that are
indistinguishable from U.S. abductions later upheld by U.S. courts. How-
ever, should the Bush Doctrine express itself in the form of forcible abduc-
tion, it will fit comfortably within settled domestic judicial doctrine. 18
The Ker-Frisbie-Yunis-Alvarez-Machain approach has been subject to
many of the same, and some additional, criticisms as the necessity and self-
defense justifications. 19 Commentators have articulated the following
concerns: that nations who sponsor terrorism may reciprocate with their
own forcible abductions; 1 20 that the approach may eviscerate treaty law;
121
that the U.S. nexus to the act of terrorism is tenuous; 1 2 2 that it establishes
precedent for ignoring established international law, including respect for
territorial sovereignty; and that it violates the UN Charter's Article 2(3)
prohibition against actions threatening international peace. 1 23 Addition-
ally, one could criticize Alvarez-Machain, although not Ker or Yunis, for its
failure to accord proper respect to the protests of the affected nations.
124
2. Israel: Justifying Abduction
The United States is not alone in its approval of the forcible abduction
of international offenders; Israel has also established a model endorsing
forcible abduction. For instance, on May 11, 1960, Israeli agents abducted
infamous Nazi war criminal Adolf Eichmann from Argentina to stand trial
for war crimes in Israel. 1 25 Although Israel claimed that Eichmann had
118. See, e.g., Alvarez-Machain, 331 F.3d at 619.
119. See Michell, supra note 5, at 409 n.140 (citing numerous critics of the Alvarez-
Machain majority); see also Hector H. Cardenas, Jr., Casenote, United States v. Alvarez-
Machain: Result Oriented Jurisprudence, 16 Hous. J. INT'L L. 101, 133-36 (1993) (criti-
cizing the majority's opinion as undermining relations with Mexico and encouraging
retaliatory abductions by other nations).
120. See Abramovsky, supra note 3, at 139; see also Charles Biblowit, Case Comment,
Transborder Abductions and United States Policy: Comments on United States v. Alvarez-
Machain, 9 N.Y. INT'L L. REV. 105, 115 (1996) (considering a scenario in which Iran,
citing Alvarez-Machain as precedent, abducts Salman Rushdie from U.S. territory).
121. Homrig, supra note 79, at 704; see also William A. Galston, Why A First Strike
Will Surely Backfire, WASH. POST, June 16, 2002, at B1 (arguing that preemptive action
against Iraq would "end the system of international institutions").
122. Abramovsky, supra note 3, at 138 (stating that the absence of a weightier nexus
increases the danger of provoking retaliation from unfriendly nations, setting unsound
precedent for other nations, and undermining respect for relations among nations).
123. Kash, supra note 9, at 92; see also John Quigley, Commentary, Our Men in Gua-
dalajara and the Abduction of Suspects Abroad: A Comment on United States v. Alvarez-
Machain, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 723, 734-36 (1993) (arguing that abduction violates
the prohibition in human rights law against arbitrary detention).
124. See Michael Slattery, Note, Government Sanctioned Abductions: United States v.
Alvarez-Machain, 16 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 159, 163 (1996) (detailing Mexico's
diplomatic response to the abduction).
125. See Att'y Gen. of Israel v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 277, 304 (Isr. S. Ct. 1962) (sitting
as court of criminal appeals).
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been abducted by a group of volunteer citizens,' 26 Argentina, suspicious
of Israeli government involvement, filed a formal complaint with the Secur-
ity Council of the United Nations. 127 During Security Council discus-
sions, Argentina expressed concern about future abductions and violations
of its territorial sovereignty but did not specifically protest Eichmann's
abduction. 128 The Security Council, with U.S. support, passed a resolu-
tion warning that repeated violations of sovereignty would endanger inter-
national peace. 129
Eichmann claimed that the Israel Supreme Court could not assert
jurisdiction over him because Israel had abducted him without Argentina's
consent. 130 Unlike the situation in Alvarez-Machain, no extradition treaty
was in place between Israel and Argentina, and therefore Argentina had no
binding obligation to extradite. Similar to U.S. judicial analysis, the Israeli
Supreme Court first concluded that universal jurisdiction, which it
believed extended beyond piracy, served as an appropriate basis for juris-
diction. 131 The court then suggested that disputes regarding breaches of
international sovereignty were nonjusticiable and should be resolved
through vehicles in the international sphere. 132 Because Argentina had
126. Att'y Gen. of Israel v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 18, 50-51 (Jm. D.C. 1961) (Isr.), aff'd
36 I.L.R. 277 (Isr. S. Ct. 1962).
127. Id. at 58.
128. See id. at 70-71.
129. Question Relating to the Case of Adolf Eichmann, S.C. Res. 138, U.N. SCOR,
15th Sess., 868th mtg. at 4, U.N. Doc. S/4349 (1960), reprinted in 1960 U.N.Y.B. 198,
U.N. Doc. S/4349 (1960). Security Council Resolution 138 states:
The Security Council,
Having examined the complaint that the transfer of Adolf Eichmann to the terri-
tory of Israel constitutes a violation of the sovereignty of the Argentine Republic,
Considering that the violation of the sovereignty of a Member State is incompati-
ble with the Charter of the United Nations,
Having regard to the fact that reciprocal respect for and the mutual protection of
the sovereign rights of States are an essential condition for their harmonious
coexistence,
Noting that the repetition of acts such as that giving rise to this situation would
involve a breach of the principles upon which international order is founded
creating an atmosphere of insecurity and distrust incompatible with the preser-
vation of peace,
Mindful of the universal condemnation of the persecution of the Jews under the
Nazis and of the concern of people in all countries that Eichmann should be
brought to appropriate justice for the crimes of which he is accused,
Noting at the same time that this resolution should in no way be interpreted as
condoning the odious crimes of which Eichmann is accused,
1. Declares that acts such as that under consideration, which affect the sover-
eignty of a Member State and therefore cause international friction, may, if
repeated, endanger international peace and security;
2. Requests the Government of Israel to make appropriate reparation in accor-
dance with the Charter of the United Nations and the rules of international law;
3. Expresses the hope that the traditionally friendly relations between Argentina
and Israel will be advanced.
Id. (footnote omitted)
130. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. at 279.
131. Id. at 298-304.
132. Id. at 305. Apparently the Court would refer the matter to state diplomacy, the
United Nations, or rely on non-judicial elements of comity.
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secured a UN resolution, the court considered Argentina's claims pertain-
ing to Eichmann waived and treated the issue as resolved. 13 3 Furthermore,
the Israeli Supreme Court, in upholding its jurisdiction to adjudicate,
denied Eichmann any individual right to object and noted: "It is an estab-
lished rule of law that a person being tried for an offence against the laws
of a State may not oppose his trial by reason of the illegality of his arrest or
of the means whereby he was brought within the jurisdiction of that
State."'1 34 Eichmann was convicted and hanged.
135
3. South Africa: A Contrary Approach
One might interpret the Israeli and U.S. approaches to suggest that
customary international law supporting forcible abduction is beginning to
form. 136 However, South Africa has adopted a contrary approach, as South
Africa v. Ebrahim13 7 demonstrates. In Ebrahim, South African agents had
abducted a member of the African National Congress, who was living in
Swaziland at the time of the abduction, to prosecute him for treason in
South Africa.138 The South African court concluded not only that it had
133. Id. at 306.
134. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. at 59.
135. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. at 342.
136. State practice and opinio juris are the two main requirements for establishing
customary international law. Homrig, supra note 79, at 694.
The practice of states consists of diplomatic acts, public measures, and offi-
cial statements. Practice is not limited to an affirmative showing since "inaction
may constitute state practice." Opinio juris exists when nations act or do not
act out of a sense of legal obligation. Thus, omissions can fulfill either
requirement.
The purpose of these requirements is to insure that there is solid evidence of
consent to create a legal norm. Custom reflects "gradualism" and "avoids grand
formulas and abstract ideals." In this way, customary international law,
imposed on all states, merely makes official what states already do and believe
they are obligated to do.
The practices of powerful states are given more weight in the determination of
customary international law; consequently, such powerful states have a special
responsibility. The showing of a custom recognizing their actions or omissions
"create[s] expectations that effective power will be restrained." To avoid the
uncertainties and interpretive difficulty that can arise due to the inexact nature
of such customary rules, therefore, the creation of a treaty is often preferable to
mere custom because states are treated as equals, and because treaties have the
practical benefit of being in black and white.
Sources of customary international law include judicial and arbitral decisions
of international judicial fora and treaties. However, merely entering a treaty
should not establish a custom. Similarly, a moral obligation to take action does
not establish an opinio juris. When the United States accidentally shot down
Iranian flight 655 and decided to pay the survivors due to humanitarian con-
cerns, no legal obligation existed. If such payments established a customary
international law, then states would be deterred from making them.
Id. at 694-95 (footnotes omitted). Wilske & Schiller, supra note 8, at 213 provide a
comprehensive overview of the customary law of forcible abduction, yet note that "there
are no cases from international judicial or arbitral tribunals which directly focus on the
question of jurisdiction over kidnapped persons"; Kash, supra note 8, at 139 (arguing in
favor of forcible abduction).
137. S. v. Ebrahim, 1991 (2) SALR 553 (A).
138. Id. at 553-55.
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the authority to refuse to exercise jurisdiction but that it could not exercise
jurisdiction over an abducted defendant because doing so would violate
sovereignty and threaten comity between nations. 139 This approach reso-
nated with Justice Stevens, who in his dissent in Alvarez-Machain cited
Ebrahim as the appropriate judicial response to forcible abduction and
warned that the majority's reasoning sanctioned international lawless-
ness. 140 Stevens criticized the majority for neglecting the "rule of law" and
portrayed the decision as "monstrous" and as one that would find little
support among other nations in the "civilized world."'14 1 Costa Rica has
also rejected the Alvarez-Machain holding, citing the harm to "international
law and state sovereignty."'142 Finally, Zimbabwe also endorsed the South
African approach in State v. Beahan.14 3
4. The English, Canadian, and German Responses
England traditionally followed the rule of male captus, bene detentus14 4
139. Ebrahim, 1991 (2) SALR at 556-59.
140. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. at 687-88 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
141. Id.
142. Wilske & Schiller, supra note 8, at 228-229 (citing Secretaria de Relaciones
Exteriores, 2 Limits to National Jurisdiction: Documents and Judicial Resolutions on the
Alvarez Machain Case 7, 81-82 (1993)). The justices stated:
Because of the profound harm to the rules of international law and to sover-
eignty of States that the resolution implies, this Court resolves to establish evi-
dence so it be known in this way, of the inadmissibility of such pronouncement,
and has no doubt that shortly, it will be amended by the same Court who has
issued it, in support of supremacy of law and mutual respect that must rule
between the United States and all other States with whom-under the principle
of good faith-it subjected its relation, in what concerns, to extradition treaties,
which must be construed, not only according to its content, but to practice of
law, teachings, and jurisprudence that inform it.
Id.
143. S. v. Beahan, 1992 (1) SACR 307, 317 (A). Chief Justice Gubbay stated:
In my opinion it is essential that, in order to promote confidence in and respect
for the administration of justice and preserve the judicial process from contami-
nation, a court should decline to compel an accused person to undergo a trial in
circumstances where his appearance before it has been facilitated by an act of
abduction undertaken by the prosecuting State. There is an inherent objection
to such a course both on grounds of public policy pertaining to international
ethical norms and because it imperils and corrodes the peaceful coexistence and
mutual respect of sovereign nations. For abduction is illegal under international
law, provided the abductor was not acting on his own initiative and without the
authority or connivance of his government. A contrary view would amount to a
declaration that the end justifies the means, thereby encouraging States to
become law-breakers in order to secure the conviction of a private individual.
Id.
Note, however, that as the case addressed a consensual departure from the extradition
process rather than a kidnapping, the court's language is dicta. Nevertheless it repre-
sents one court's disapproval of the exercise of jurisdiction when presented with facts
similar to those of Alvarez-Machain. See Wilske & Schiller, supra note 8, at 207.
144. Under this principle of extradition law, courts may assert jurisdiction over
defendants even if they were illegally arrested and abducted from a state where the
defendant was entitled to legal protection from such abduction. Richard J. Goldstone &
Janine Simpson, Evaluating the Role of the International Criminal Court as a Legal
Response to Terrorism, 16 H~Av. HuM. RTsJ. 13, 19 n.33 (2003).
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(wrongly captured, properly detained). 14 5 However, currently, the House
of Lords' decision in Ex parte Bennett governs English doctrine. 14 6 In Ben-
nett, the Lords determined that English courts have discretion to stay the
trial of a criminal defendant if English authorities disregarded the protec-
tions of formal extradition and illegally seized a defendant living or travel-
ing abroad. 14 7 Thus, according to Bennett, forcible abduction does not
categorically bar jurisdiction. 14 8 Although a court is not prohibited from
asserting jurisdiction over such a defendant, court dicta indicates that for-
cible abduction will likely lead to a stay in the trial: 149 Indeed, Lord Lowry
admonished, "if British officialdom at any level has participated in or
encouraged the kidnapping, it seems to represent a grave contravention of
international law, of the comity of nations, and of the rule of law generally
if our courts allow themselves to be used by the executive to try an offence
which the courts would not be dealing with if the rule of law had
prevailed." 150
145. See Ex parte Susannah Scott, 109 Eng. Rep. 166 (K.B. 1829). Chief Justice Lord
Tenderden stated:
The question, therefore, is this, whether if a person charged with a crime is
found in this country, it is the duty of the Court to take care that such a party
shall be amenable to justice, or whether we are to consider the circumstances
under which she was brought here. I thought, and still continue to think, that
we cannot inquire into them.
Id.
146. R. v. Horseferry Rd. Magistrates' Ct., (Ex parte Bennett) [1993] 3 P, 138 (H.L.).
Ex parte Bennett concerned a defendant located in South Africa whom English law
enforcement officials wanted on fraud charges. Wilske & Schiller, supra note 8, at 218.
There was no extradition treaty in force between South Africa and England, but
England's Extradition Act allowed for extradition under special arrangements. Id.
English law enforcement officials, however, did not pursue the special procedure under
the Extradition Act, but rather reached an informal agreement with their South African
counterparts. Id. Bennett later protested at his trial in England that South African law
enforcement officials had kidnapped him, forced him onto a flight bound for New Zea-
land via Taipei, intercepted him in Taipei and had flown him back to South Africa, and
finally flown him to England, even though the South African Supreme Court had
enjoined the abduction. Id. In finding that they could stay Bennett's trial, the Law
Lords did not investigate whether the authorities of the countries through which Bennett
had passed-South Africa and Taiwan-had protested or acquiesced in the forcible
abduction, or whether physical brutality had been used in the abduction. Id.
147. Id. at 139c.
148. Id.; see also Wilske & Schiller, supra note 8, at 219.
149. Contra Andrew L.-T. Choo, International Kidnapping, Disguised Extradition and
Abuse of Process, 57 MOD. L. REv. 626, 632 (1994). Choo argues:
One wonders how willing a court would be to stay a prosecution for mass mur-
der on the basis that the English police circumvented the relevant extradition
procedures in securing the return of the accused to England. Yet a stay is pre-
cisely what Lord Griffiths would seem to require even in this situation.
150. Ex parte Bennett, [1993] 3 P. at 163c. Consider also the practice of Australia in
Levinge v. Director of Custodial Services (1987) 9 N.S.W.L.R. 546. Levinge did not
directly concern issues of international law; however, the court indicated that the fact
that the defendant was abducted would provide sound support for staying criminal pro-
ceedings to avoid abuse of process. Levinge, 9 N.S.W.R. at 556G-557A; see also Wilske
& Schiller, supra note 8, at 223. The Court concluded:
Where a person, however unlawfully, is brought into the jurisdiction and is
before a court in this State, that court has undoubted jurisdiction to deal with
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Canada also has historically followed the male captus, bene detentus
rule, but in contrast to England, has continued to apply this rule in the
twentieth century. 15 1 In In re Hartnett, Canadian authorities lured the
defendants into Canada by telling them they were required to testify before
him or her. But it also has discretion not to do so, where to exercise its discre-
tion would involve an abuse of the court's process. [Circumstances where the
court should not exercise discretion may include the prosecuting authorities']
wrongful [or] unlawful involvement in bypassing the regular machinery for
extradition and participating in unauthorized and unlawful removal of criminal
suspects from one jurisdiction to another.
Levinge, 9 N.S.W.R. at 556G-557A.
Further, consider the discretionary approach to jurisdiction followed by the New Zea-
land court in R. v. Hartley, [1978] 2 N.Z.L.R. 199. Hartley's reasoning would seem to
fully apply to a forcible abduction scenario. The court reasoned:
Some may say that in the present case a New Zealand citizen attempted to avoid
a criminal responsibility by leaving the country: that his subsequent conviction
has demonstrated the utility of the short cut adopted by the police to have him
brought back. But this must never become an area where it will be sufficient to
consider that the end has justified the means. The issues raised by this affair
are basic to the whole concept of freedom in society.
Id. at 216-17. In addition, the French Tribunal Correctionnel d'Avesnes required that
the circumstances surrounding the abduction of a defendant be reviewed before juris-
diction is granted. In reJolis, 7 Ann. Dig. 191 (1933-34). However, the force of this
position seems limited in light of the judgment of the Cour de Cassation in Re Argoud,
45 1.L.R. 90 (Cass. Crim. 1964), where the court held:
[In international law, the State which is entitled to complain of damage suf-
fered by one of its nationals or protected persons exercises a right of its own
when it seeks reparation. It follows that the individual who claims to be
injured . . . is without any right or capacity to plead in judicial proceedings a
violation of international law, a fortiori when the State in question makes no
claim.
Id. at 95; see also Wilske & Schiller, supra note 8, at 228. While one might read Argoud
to establish the rule that defendants cannot complain of abduction where the nation
whose territorial sovereignty was violated has not objected, French legal scholars have
not accorded it this reading. Wilske & Schiller, supra note 8, at 227. Instead, Argoud is
viewed as a case involving abduction by private parties, and the rule announced in Jolis
is treated as good law for purposes of abduction by state actors. Id. NGUYEN Quoc
DINH, DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 448 (4th ed. Librairie Genfral de Droit et deJurispru-
dence 1992); PIERRE-MARIE Dupuy, DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 48 (Dalloz 2d ed. 1992).
Hence, French courts cannot assert jurisdiction over defendants abducted from foreign
countries. Wilske & Schiller, supra note 8, at 227.
Switzerland reviews the circumstances surrounding a forcible abduction in deciding
whether to grant an extradition request. Id. at 228. In a 1982 case, the Swiss Federal
Court of Lausanne found that it would be unlawful for Switzerland to grant extradition
to a third state, where an individual had entered Switzerland as the result of fraud propa-
gated by the country requesting extradition. See Belgischer Staatsangeh6riger, gegen
Bundesanwaltschaft, 1983 Europaische Grundrechte-Zeitschrift 435 (1983).
151. See R. v. Walton, [1905] 10 O.L.R. 94 (Can.). In this case, U.S. officials detained
a Canadian citizen in Buffalo, New York until the Toronto police arrived and transported
him back to Canada. The accused alleged that his arrest constituted a violation of the
U.S.-Canada extradition treaty. However, Judge Osler, following Ker, held that the cir-
cumstances by which the defendant had been brought before the court did not affect the
court's jurisdiction. The court reasoned that the defendant had other remedies at his
disposal, including a civil suit against the police for wrongful detention. Furthermore,
the court held that only the United States could make a claim on the defendant's behalf
under international law, as indicated by the extradition treaty. Id.; see also Michell,
supra note 5, at 460 (discussing Walton).
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the Ontario Securities Commission and then arrested them on charges of
fraud. 152 The applicants argued that the Canadian authorities' fraudulent
misrepresentations violated their right to justice and due process of law
under the Canadian Bill of Rights. 15 3 They contended that to allow their
trial to proceed would constitute an abuse of process and a circumvention
of the extradition process. 154 Justice Hughes, however, held that "an illegal
arrest does not deprive a Judge of jurisdiction to entertain the prosecution
of the victim' 1 5 5 and denied the applications. He reasoned that fraudu-
lently luring the applicants into Canada could not violate due process
because there is no right to an extradition proceeding within one's home
jurisdiction. 1 56 Yet, should the Canadian court face a forcible abduction
case again, the court, similar to English practice, would possess the power
to order a stay in the proceedings. 15 7
Although English and Canadian courts disagree on whether they are
required to respect customary international law that prohibits them from
exercising jurisdiction over an abducted defendant, they agree that such
customary international law does in fact exist. The Federal Constitutional
Court of Germany, however, held that no customary rule of international
law prevented the assertion of jurisidiction following abduction in the first
place. 158 The Court ruled that an abducted person only needs to be
returned when the victim nation objects to the abduction. 159 As a result,
in a subsequent abduction case, the German Supreme Court held that pro-
ceedings should be stayed after the Netherlands complained that German
officials had illegally apprehended an individual from the Netherlands.' 60
It should be noted, however, that the decisions occurred in 1986, well
before Alvarez-Machain, and that the court might reconsider the issue if
faced with another abduction case. 16 1
152. In re Hartnett, [1973] 1 O.R.2d 206, 207 (Can.).
153. Act for the Recognition and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms, ch. 44, 1960 S.C. 519 (Can.) (granting the right not to be deprived of life, liberty,
or security of the person except by due process of law).
154. Hartnett, 1 O.R.2d at 208.
155. Id. at 209.
156. See R. v. Sunila, [1986] 71 N.S.R.2d. 300 (Can.) (noting the traditional rule that
illegal arrest does not displace a court's jurisdiction, but observing that the rule may be
subject to Charter challenge).
157. Id. While the Canadian government is empowered to legislate with extraterrito-
rial effect, the courts have read the Charter as limited to territorial application. See R. v.
A, B & C, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 995 (Can.); Singh v. Canada, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 177; Canadian
Council of Churches v. R., 11990] 2 F.C. 534, affid on other grounds [19921 1 S.C.R. 236;
Ruparel v. Canada, [1990] 3 F.C. 615; see also Michell, supra note 5, at 461 ("While
Canadian courts are unable to prevent the prosecution of an accused person, they do
possess an inherent right to stay proceedings where there has been an abuse of
process . . . ").
158. 39 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 1427 (1986) (Ger. Fed. Const. Ct. 1985).
159. Id. at 1428; see also Wilske & Schiller, supra note 8, at 223.
160. 40 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 3087 (1987) (Ger. S. Ct. Dec. 19, 1986); see
also Wilske & Schiller, supra note 8, at 223-25 (discussing the German court's
approach).
161. See Wilske & Schiller, supra note 8, at 224 (noting that legal scholars criticized
the Federal Constitutional Court decision for being narrow).
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The preceding section demonstrates that there are two main points of
contention: First, whether there exists customary international law forbid-
ding a court to exercise jurisdiction over an abducted defendant-England
and Canada arguing that there is and Germany finding that there is not-
and second, whether regardless of customary international law, it is proper
for a court to exercise jurisdiction over an abducted defendant-the United
States, Israel, and Germany finding that it is, and South Africa, Costa Rica,
and Zimbabwe insisting that it is not. As such, the soundness of the prac-
tice is ripe for further discussion.
II. The Efficiency Justification: A Proper Role for Forcible Abduction
A. A Model for Crisis Management
This section applies the efficient breach justification, which is based
on the tenets of law and economics, to the realm of international law and,
more specifically, to forcible abduction. 16 2 The justification serves as a cri-
sis management model where traditional mechanisms fail. In essence,
under the efficient breach justification, forcible abductions of terrorists are
optimal because the benefits to the breaching nation and to the interna-
tional community outweigh its CoStS. 1 6 3 Furthermore, fear of foreign retal-
iation and of eroding international institutions and peace provides a check
on states that embrace forcible abduction and ensures that these states do
not abduct defendants without carefully weighing the costs and
benefits. 1 6
4
Under the efficient breach justification, detaining and prosecuting
known terrorists is preferable to allowing terrorists to remain at large out
of a fear of infringing on international law or the UN Charter. So long as
the abducting nation can claim a jurisdictional interest and the target
nation, if not the international community as a whole, has failed to act or is
incapable of doing so, abduction of the terrorist defendant is efficient and
therefore supportable.
162. See Morrison, supra note 13, at 183. Morrison writes:
Economic theory suggests that when the benefits of breaching an agreement
exceed the costs of complying with an agreement, the system governing the
agreement should allow a party to breach the agreement. On the other hand,
when the costs of breach outweigh the benefits of breach, the governance mech-
anisms should create an incentive for a party to comply with the agreement.
The theory of efficient breaches predicts that parties will attempt to forge mech-
anisms that allow efficient breaches and deter inefficient breaches.
Id.; see also BETH V. YARBROUGH & ROBERT M. YARBROUGH, COOPERATION AND GOVERNANCE
IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE: THE STRATEGIC ORGANIZATIONAL APPROACH 56 (1992); William J.
Aceves, The Economic Analysis of International Law: Transaction Cost Economics and the
Concept of State Practice, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 995 (1996) (arguing that an interdis-
ciplinary approach which merges transaction cost economics with legal analysis is help-
ful for understanding problems of international cooperation).
163. See Dunoff & Trachtman, supra note 13, at 4 (suggesting that economic analysis
may be useful for understanding international problems of institutional choice and that
this analysis is not limited to wealth maximization questions).
164. See discussion infra Part II.A-B.
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Because the efficient breach doctrine encourages breach where the
resulting benefits exceed the damages, the existence of customary interna-
tional law favoring or opposing forcible abduction, while informative, is
not ultimately determinative. 16 5 The existence of customary international
law on this point, rather, is relevant for determining under which circum-
stances an abduction would constitute a breach and triggers an analysis of
whether such breach can be justified as efficient. As such, the contours of
customary international law limit and define the class of abductions to
which the efficient breach theory can apply. Where abduction would con-
stitute a breach of international law, breach is efficient if (1) the terrorist
threat appears imminent and the opportunity for abduction is fleeting;166
(2) the target nation is unwilling to extradite or prosecute; (3) the opera-
tion involves minimal threat to bystanders; (4) the territorial infringement
is reasonably limited; and (5) the accused will receive humane treatment
and a fair trial. Under these conditions, efficient breach functions along-
side the existing international order during moments of distress without
necessitating a fundamental change in the structure of international
law.167
The Israeli model and portions of U.S. jurisprudence reflect this
approach. 168 In the Eichmann abduction, a known offender was captured
with minimal infringement on state sovereignty, and the event was marked
by the absence of harm to the accused or civilians. The Israeli court
favored universal jurisdiction over adherence to its obligation not to violate
another state's territory; it was more concerned with providing an effective
judicial remedy and less concerned with how the presence of Eichmann
was secured. Moreover, in spite of the forcible abduction, the defendant
received due process in the form of a full and fair trial. Argentina's griev-
ance about the territorial infringement was redressed through a complaint
to the UN, which sternly warned Israel, the offending nation. Dispute reso-
lution facilitated by an international body, such as the UN, and initiated by
a complaint from the aggrieved nation represents the damages portion of
the efficient breach equation.' 6 9
165. But see Alvarez-Machain, 331 F.3d at 619 (indicating that no specific binding
obligation prohibits the United States from engaging in transborder abductions).
166. See infra note 175 and accompanying text.
167. The U.N. General Assembly's main weakness is that, being composed of nations
with differing views on the best approach to combating terrorism, it is unable to formu-
late and pursue a consistent antiterrorism policy. See Phillip A. Seymour, The Legitimacy
of Peacetime Reprisal as a Tool Against State Sponsored Terrorism, 39 NAVAL L. REV. 221,
234 (1990); see also W. Michael Reisman, Editorial Comment, Coercion and Self-Determi-
nation: Construing Charter Article 2(4), 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 642, 643 (1984).
168. Although Eichmann posed no imminent threat, the gravity of his crimes and the
limited opportunity for capture might nevertheless justify abduction. See Louis HENKIN
ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 885 (2d ed. 1986) (discussing the pos-
sibility of permissive enforcement of universal jurisdiction against particularly heinous
criminals who are the targets of abduction). The contours of the imminence prong are
discussed infra Part IlI.C.
169. See Dunoff & Trachtman, supra note 13, at 31. The authors noted:
[Eifficient breach theory presupposes effective adjudicatory and enforcement
mechanisms that, in the absence of a liquidated damages clause, can determine
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To be sure, resort to the doctrine of reprisal infringes on territorial
integrity and contravenes international law, but it does preserve interna-
tional order. 170 Under this doctrine, a state may commit an otherwise ille-
gal act (assuming for the moment the illegality of forcible abduction) if it
commits the act in retaliation for an international delinquency. 17 1 In this
regard the breach serves as a gap-filler, redressing the breach of the harbor-
ing nation when traditional remedies fail. Here, Argentina provided sanc-
tuary to a war criminal, Israel redressed this breach through abduction,
and the international community criticized the infringement and restored
balance. 1
72
Still, commentators have indicated the difficulties of measuring appro-
priate damages-how should the international community quantify the
costs of territorial infringement in monetary terms, and what enforcement
mechanisms are in place to ensure proper damages are paid?173 Two par-
and compel payment of the appropriate level of damages in the event of a
breach. That is, where there are no institutions that can provide for payment of
damages, an "efficient breach" rule cannot be operationalized.
Id.
170. See John Quigley, Missiles with a Message: The Legality of the United States Raid on
Iraq's Intelligence Headquarters, 17 -IHAsTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 241, 265 (1994).
Quigley states:
Reprisal is the use of armed force, undertaken in response to a past use of
armed force by another state, but where there was no ongoing attack and hence
no need of force for self-defense purposes. Force could be used, under the doc-
trine of reprisal, as a response to a prior and already completed use of force.
The doctrine of reprisal was accepted in international law in the pre-UN Charter
era, when no international mechanism existed to respond to a threat to the
peace. Force could be used in reprisal, either to deter future attacks or as retri-
bution for past attacks, so long as the level of the force used did not exceed that
of the prior force.
Id. (footnotes omitted). The doctrine of reprisal, however, did not survive the creation
of the UN Charter, whose Article 2(4) prohibits the use of force subject only to an Arti-
cle 51 exception. Id. at 266. But see Seymour, supra note 167, at 232-33 (arguing that
reprisals do not disturb the vitality of Article 51 because they are not aimed at the politi-
cal independence of states, and alternatively that, at the least, if a state is repeatedly
targeted by state-supported or -sponsored terrorism and has no other effective means of
responding it should no longer have a duty to refrain from peacetime reprisals against
the state supporting or sponsoring the attacks against it).
171. See J.G. STARKE, INTERNATIONAL LAw 520 (1989); Derek W. Bowett, Economic
Coercion and Reprisals by States, 13 VA. J. INT'L L. 1, 10 (1972).
172. Jonathan A. Bush, How Did We Get Here? Foreign Abduction After Alvarez-
Machain, 45 STAN. L. REv. 939, 978 (1993) (suggesting that where a known offender
resides in a country that refuses to make a good faith effort to arrest him and bring him
to justice, there is a compelling argument for forcible abduction); see also Seymour, supra
note 167, at 237-40 (stating that if an offending state refuses or fails to meet another
state's demands, the claimant state may undertake an act of reprisal when it is necessary
to obtain redress and it is proportionate to the original injury).
173. See Dunoff & Trachtman, supra note 13, at 31; see also Morrison, supra note 13,
at 190. Morrison explains:
Typically, international agreements involve transfers of legal obligations, not
transfers of money. Such transfers are discrete rather than continuous. For
example, it would be difficult for Germany to pay Russia $25 billion to compen-
sate Russia for the risk that Germany might breach a trade agreement. Thus, we
are left with a situation in which even an efficient breach would result in an
uncompensated risk to the non-breaching party.
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ties could, of course, agree to submit a territorial infringement suit to the
International Court of Justice, which could levy appropriate damages that
would be enforceable by the UN. 174 Alternatively, if the abduction materi-
ally violated an existing treaty obligation to extradite, as the defendant
alleged in the Alvarez-Machain case, the nonbreaching party could, under
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, suspend operation of the
treaty by refusing to extradite any accused criminal or by withdrawing
entirely and seeking to renegotiate terms.1 7
5
The best recourse, however, is to seek relief directly from the UN
because it has historically been the institution of choice for aggrieved
nations following forcible abductions 17 6 and because its assessment of
damages is the most likely to be obeyed, or failing that, enforced. By reso-
lution, the UN can demand that the breaching party pay reparations,
impose trade sanctions, or inflict reputational lOSS. 1 7 7 Although it may
seem inconsistent that a nation can breach the tenets of the UN but then
rely on the dignity of that same institution to assess and enforce damages
fairly, it is in fact not inconsistent. Breach of the obligation to refrain from
infringing on another country's territorial sovereignty is efficient only
because that country's failure to extradite or prosecute creates a breach of a
treaty-based duty or a danger (cost) in excess of the damage caused by the
abduction, or both, and the UN is unable to respond swiftly to this dan-
ger-not because territorial sovereignty or UN principles are not important
to respect. After it becomes more efficient for a country to breach an inter-
national agreement or international custom because of exceptional circum-
stances, the UN can do what it is best at-restoring order and respect for
international institutions and agreements through a broadly supported res-
olution. There remains the question of how to properly assess the damages
owed by the abducting state, but valuing the property damaged or
destroyed by the abduction and adding thereto a negotiated compensation
Id.
174. Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 36, 59 Stat.
1055. The United States modified its acceptance of the ICJ's Article 36(2) jurisdiction
when Nicaragua filed suit in 1984. Under the UN Charter, the Security Council can
enforce a judgment by the International Court of Justice against a member of the United
Nations. Article 94 .of the UN Charter states as follows:
1. Each Member of the United Nations undertakes to comply with the decision
of the International Court of Justice in any case to which it is a party.
2. If any party to a case fails to perform the obligations incumbent upon it under
a judgment rendered by the Court, the other party may have recourse to the
Security Council, which may, if it deems necessary, make recommendations or
decide upon measures to be taken to give effect to the judgment.
U.N. CHARTER, art. 94. While the Security Council's recommendations are nonbinding,
its decisions may give rise to enforcement measures. Id. art. 93. In order to pass such
an enforcement measure, the Security Council must have an affirmative vote of seven
members and the concurrence of all permanent members. Id. art. 27.
175. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, arts. 56, 60, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331.
176. See, e.g., Question Relating to the Case of Adolf Eichmann, supra note 128.
177. See Morrison, supra note 13, at 196 n.49 (describing loss of reputation as a form
of sanction).
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for any insult caused by territorial infringement does not appear to be an
impossible task for the UN.
Capturing a grievous offender and condemning the heinous crimes he
committed benefits the international community by removing a threat and
discouraging other potential criminals from committing similar offenses.
After Israel's breach of its obligation under customary international law to
respect territorial sovereignty remedied Argentina's breach of its obligation
not to provide safe harbor to war criminals, institutions remedied Israel's
breach. This end is achieved without lengthy and fruitless debate over self-
defense or strained readings of international conventions or treaties that
were prevalent in Yunis and Alvarez-Machain; instead, the court can defer to
existing international institutions that successfully quell any outrage. 178
So long as countries remain committed to international comity, criticism
of the use of forcible abduction will constrain the practice and prevent it
from completely eroding the foundations of existing international agree-
ments and institutions, yet effectively tolerate it where abduction is
efficient.
The application of efficient breach to international law is not without
detractors: Professor Harold Hongju Koh, responding to the events of Sep-
tember 11, 2001, suggests that "over the years we have developed an elabo-
rate system of domestic and international laws, institutions, regimes, and
decision-making procedures precisely so that they will be consulted and
obeyed, not ignored at a time like this."'179 Professor Koh suggests that
maintaining the "higher moral ground" requires nations to seek justice by
locating and abiding by the applicable laws.180 Under his view, efficient
breaches and other departures from existing norms only lead to troubling
outcomes and lack legitimacy. However, his analysis fails to consider that
in a catch-and-snatch self-help scenario, efficient breach is deployed
because of international paralysis. Resort to diplomacy and existing
norms is ineffective where the host nation refuses to prosecute or extradite
and where the condemnation of an international tribunal does little to pre-
vent terrorist movement or activity.
Further, Professor Koh's analysis undervalues the element of necessity
178. See id. at 207. Morrison explains how the imposition of a penalty through an
international institution will impact the decision of a country contemplating forcible
abduction:
[C]onsidering the case of a mandatory penalty .... breach will occur if the
benefits exceed the mandatory penalty. If the penalty is greater than the cost, an
efficient breach will be deterred. If the penalty is less than cost, an inefficient
breach will be allowed to occur. However, if the penalty is equal to cost, only
efficient breach occurs.
179. Harold Hongju Koh, The Spirit of the Laws, 43 H~Av. IN'L LJ. 23, 23 (2002).
Professor Koh indicates that forceful, targeted military action in response to September
11th is both proper and legitimate under the UN charter system, but cautions that the
more unilateral, indiscriminate, and prolonged the use of force is, the more likely it is to
violate both the letter and the spirit of international law. Id. at 24-29.
180. Id. at 23, 39.
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when a terrorist attack is imminent. 18 1 The efficient breach method seeks
to maximize both short-run and long-run utility182 -measured by the con-
tinued existence and peaceful interaction of states, which ensures the
opportunity for citizens to live peaceful and productive lives. In the short
run , the international interest is furthered by preventing future terrorist
acts. In the long run, so long as mechanisms exist to constrain the prac-
tice, efficient breach serves as a gap-filler, regulating delinquent states.
Thus, the theory of efficient breach counters Professor Koh's appeal to the
legitimacy of the rule of law and disdain for actions that undermine
existing norms with a claim of necessity, self-preservation and protection
of international peace, and a consequentialist morality 18 3 measuring the
utility of forcible abduction by its outcomes; if no future terrorism occurs
then the abduction is justifiable. Indeed, the justification might also be
framed as honoring the territorial integrity of a host notion by removing a
threat to the victim nation's existence. 18 4 This is true especially where a
host nation is incapable of self-policing due to corruption, civil strife, fam-
ine, or budgetary or structural limitations. The Achille-Lauro affair illus-
trates the utility of forcible abduction in this rubric.
B. The Achille-Lauro Incident: An Illustration
On October 7, 1985, members of the Palestine Liberation Front
("P.L.F.") hijacked an Italian cruise ship and demanded the release of pris-
oners held by Israel. 18 5 The alleged mastermind was Mohammed Abbas,
the group's leader and a known terrorist.18 6 After a series of failed negotia-
tions between the P.L.F. and West Germany, Italy, and Egypt, the vessel
docked in Port Said, Egypt.18 7 Once there, all hostages were released
except for Leon Klinghoffer, who had been shot and thrown overboard
while the ship was at sea.' 88 Despite repeated U.S. requests to prosecute
181. See Michael N. Schmitt, State-Sponsored Assassination in International and Domes-
tic Law, 17 YALE J. INT'L L. 609, 648 (1992) ("Regardless of the relative strength of the
terrorist group, a state that hesitates to act against terrorists may lose the opportunity to
act at all.").
182. "The principle of utility.., approves or disapproves of every action ... according
to the tendency which it appears to have to augment or diminish the happiness of the
party whose interest is in question[.]" JEREMY BENTHAM, 1 JEREMY BENTHAM'S WORKs 1-2
(1843).
183. See Theodore P. Seto, The Morality of Terrorism, 35 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1227,
1240-41 (2002) (defining "consequentialism" as a moral system that holds that an act is
morally right if its consequences are desirable and arguing that it provides little practical
guidance when applied to politically motivated violence).
184. But cf. Dunoff & Trachtman, supra note 13, at 46-47 (describing the difficulty of
measuring the value of harm or benefit to another state in monetary terms).
185. John Tagliabue, Ship Carrying 400 Seized, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 1985, at Al. The
group threatened to kill the vessel's passengers, beginning with U.S. nationals, unless
Israel promptly released fifty imprisoned Palestinians. Beck & Arend, supra note 5, at
175.
186. See Kash, supra note 9, at 89 (stating that Italy tried and convicted Abbas in
absentia for masterminding the hijacking).
187. Beck & Arend, supra note 5, at 175.
188. Id. at 176. Klinghoffer was a U.S. citizen-hence the U.S. interest in prosecuting
the hijackers. See id.
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the offenders, Egypt resisted and even attempted to deceive the United
States by insinuating that the hijackers had already left its territory.18 9
However, on October 10th, an airliner chartered by the Egyptian govern-
ment sought to deliver the Palestinians to Tunis, Tunisia. 190 U.S. naval
forces intercepted the airplane and forced it to land at an Italian North
Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) base in Sicily. 19 1 There, U.S. troops
surrounded the airliner and, in turn, were surrounded by Italian troops. 1 92
Following a tense standoff, the American and Italian governments reached
an agreement allowing the Italian forces to take custody of the hijackers
including Abbas. 1 9 3 The Italian government prosecuted the hijackers but
refused to detain Abbas, who traveled to Yugoslavia, then to South Yemen,
and eventually to Iraq, which denied extradition.' 9 4 Abbas remained at
large until April 2003, when a U.S. special operations team captured him
in Baghdad during Operation Iraqi Freedom. 1 95
While the Italian government complained of violations of its airspace,
international reaction to the U.S. self-help was, on the whole, muted. 196
The Security Council discussions did not address the United States' use of
force. 1 9 7 Predictably, a Palestinian representative labeled the action as "air
piracy," while the Israeli delegate described the intervention as "coura-
geous."'19 8 The Secretary General of the Organization of the Islamic Con-
ference described U.S. action as "a matter which has legal implications
which [he did] not intend to address."'199
Arguably, U.S. self-help was necessary in the Achille-Lauro incident in
order to fill a void in international law. Italy, Yugoslavia, South Yemen,
Iraq, and particularly Egypt, which harbored the terrorists and then lied
about it, had all breached a duty to prosecute or extradite the offenders. All
conditions necessary to justify an efficient breach in the form of reprisal
were present: a prior international delinquency and an unsatisfied demand
for prosecution or extradition. The reprisal was a proportional response,
and self-help was utilized only because all reasonable alternatives had been
exhausted.20 0 One international law expert observed that the U.S.
response was justified even if the interception constituted a violation of
189. Judith Miller, Egypt Says It Gave Gunmen to P.L.O., N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 1985, at
All.
190. See Beck & Arend, supra note 5, at 176. Tunisia and Greece denied the aircraft
permission to land. Id.
191. Id.
192. Kash, supra note 9, at 89.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. See Douglas Holt, U.S. Captures Achille Lauro Mastermind, CHIC. TRIB., Apr. 16,
2003, at 22. Abbas stated in an interview that the Achille Lauro hijacking and murder of
Klinghoffer were mistakes. See id. "Nobody is without mistakes .... My main goal now
is to say that we need peace." Id.
196. See Beck & Arend, supra note 5, at 176.
197. See generally U.N. SCOR, 40th Sess., 2622nd mtg. at 38-46, 53-55, U.N. Doc. S/
PV.2622 (1985).
198. See id.
199. U.N. Doc. S/PV.2622, supra note 199, at 32-38.
200. See Seymour, supra note 167, at 237-39.
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international law (though he did not believe it did) because it redressed the
"worse breach" by Egypt.201 The efficiency justification points to the suc-
cess in deterring terrorism and in redressing the breach of other nations
that refused to prosecute or extradite the terrorist, and emphasizes that
international relations suffered no permanent harm, as evidenced by the
tone of the Security Council discussions and the fact that the United States
was not required to pay damages. 20 2
Abduction would be most effective if the abducting state sought to
remove dangerous terrorists from circulation without injuring bystanders,
was able to assert jurisdiction over abducted terrorists in domestic courts
under the passive personality principle (although universal jurisdiction
would also suffice), and at the same time afforded the accused the benefits
of a full and fair trial. Such an arrangement would fit comfortably in the
Ker-Yunis line without violating Toscanino because under Ker-Yunis the
reach of jurisdiction trumps concerns over presence and because interna-
tional response to imminent threats is impotent. Indeed, one commenta-
tor, although troubled by the United States' apparent lack of understanding
of international principles and by its failure to comply with extradition
treaties, suggested that the incident could be described as good crisis man-
agement because the terrorists had already taken hostages and the abduc-
tion was not preemptive. 20 3 He further argued that U.S. interception could
be justified because other states had failed to act in accordance with their
duties under international law and because any tension between Egypt,
Italy, and the United States was short-lived. 20 4 In summary, efficient
breach, in the form of reprisal, quashes an immediate threat without caus-
ing derogation or collapse of the existing system; the injured nation
redresses a harm that the UN cannot, and the UN operates effectively to
maintain harmony.
III. The Israeli Interceptions and Alvarez-Machain: Testing the
Boundaries of the Efficiency Justification
A. Israeli Self-Help: Within the Bounds of Acceptability
The heavily criticized Israeli self-help efforts and Alvarez-Machain pre-
sent harder cases for the efficient breach doctrine. Consider the following
incident: On August 10, 1973, an Israeli aircraft intercepted a flight from
Beirut to Iraq and forced it to land in Israel because Israel believed that
201. See Stuart Taylor, Jr., Capture of Hijackers: Plane Diversion Raises Legal Issues,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 1985, at All (quoting Andreas Lowenfeld).
202. See Morrison, supra note 13, at 190. Morrison argues:
The failure to compensate injuries resulting from efficient acts does not make a
system untenable. As an illustration, consider the common law of negligence. A
plaintiff cannot recover for a defendant's action if the benefits of the action out-
weigh the risk to the plaintiff since such action is reasonable and, therefore, not
actionable in a court of law.
203. See Gerald P. McGinley, The Achille Lauro Case: A Case Study in Crisis Law, Policy
and Management, in LEGAL RESPONSES TO INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: U.S. PROCEDURAL
AsPECTS 323, 359-60 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 1988).
204. Id.
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Palestinian terrorists were on board the aircraft.2 05 After hours of ques-
tioning the crew and the ninety passengers, Israeli officials determined
that no terrorists were on board and allowed the flight to resume. 20 6 Dur-
ing subsequent UN Security Council meetings, the Israeli representative
contended that the action was justified on self-defense grounds because
Israel possessed the inherent right to protect its people from future terrorist
attacks. 20 7 Unconvinced, the Security Council, with U.S. support,
assessed damages and passed a unanimous resolution condemning the
action. 208
In a similar incident on February 4, 1986, Israel intercepted a Libyan
airliner in an effort to effect a forcible abduction of terrorists believed to be
on board the aircraft. 20 9 The Israelis again determined that no terrorists
were on board and permitted the flight to continue. 2 10 During discussions
following the incident, Israeli officials again justified their actions as self-
defense. 2 1 1 This time, the U.S. government, perhaps in response to its
experience in the Achille-Lauro affair, refused to accept a Security Council
Resolution condemning the interception of the aircraft as wrongful per
se. 21 2 Instead, the United States suggested that while it opposed forcible
intervention generally and specifically opposed the Israeli action, which it
thought was based on inadequate evidence of prior terrorist action specifi-
cally, exceptional circumstances could justify intervention.2 13 U.S.
Ambassador to the United Nations Vernon Walters commented that on
Article 51 grounds, "[a] State whose territory or citizens are subjected to
continuing terrorist attacks may respond with the appropriate use of force
to defend itself against further attacks. ' 214
Lastly, on July 28, 1989, Israeli helicopters landed in a Lebanese vil-
lage, where commandos kidnapped Sheik Abdul Karim Obeid from his
home.2 15 Officials alleged that the Sheik had incited and planned attacks
against Israel and that he had provided shelter to terrorist members of
Hezbollah. 2 16 During the mission, one of Obeid's neighbors was killed by
gunfire. 2 17 The abduction aroused severe international criticism: a unani-
mous Security Council resolution, although explicitly mentioning neither
205. See Beck & Arend, supra note 5, at 174-75.
206. Id. at 175.
207. U.N. SCOR, 28th Sess., 1738th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/PV.1738 (1973).
208. Id.
209. See Beck & Arend, supra note 5, at 176-77.
210. Id. at 177.
211. U.N. SCOR, 41st Sess., 2651st mtg. at 19-20, U.N. Doc. S/PV.2651 (1986).




215. Beck & Arend, supra note 5, at 177. Shiite Muslim leader Sheik Obeid, who is
closely aligned with Iran, is suspected of having planned the kidnapping of Colonel
William Higgins, which took place in February 1988. Abramovsky, supra note 73, at
202-03.
216. See Beck & Arend, supra note 5, at 177-78.
217. Id.
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Israel nor Sheik Obeid, condemned all acts of hostage taking or
abduction.2 18
While the Obeid abduction is a closer case because of the loss of civil-
ian life2 1 9-an issue that does not arise in the other interceptions-Israel
could make a plausible efficiency theory argument that it chose the lesser
international evil: Obeid was a leading figure of a violent movement, and
Lebanon provided him refuge with no apparent intent to prosecute him.
Arguably, Israel could legitimately claim passive personality and universal
jurisdiction over his crimes.
Nonetheless, there are two main concerns with the Israeli abductions.
First, there is a concern about the loss of civilian life. Even though a direct
incursion into another state's territory is of course the riskiest, this does
not justify civilian casualties. In fact, the social utility of the self-help
decreases as the risk of injury to innocents increases. However, the other
instances of self-help, many of which involved large numbers of hostages
or bystanders but did not lead to civilian casualties, demonstrate that the
practice need not invariably cost innocent lives. In any case, this criticism
applies only to a single case and is insufficient to undercut the justification
or invalidate the practice.
The second concern, voiced by the United States, is that Israel had not
sufficiently demonstrated that Obeid had a history of terrorist activity-the
same criticism that it had levied against the 1986 interception, and also
similar to Justice Stevens's charge of lawlessness in Alvarez-Machain. How-
ever, in both instances Israel sought repeat offenders, whom it believed to
be traveling free from any restraint by their host nations. Further, given
the repeated attacks by terrorists connected to Obeid, Israeli claims that
they were facing an imminent threat were at least as persuasive as U.S.
claims of imminent threats in Yunis or the Achille-Lauro incident-cases in
which U.S. courts did or would likely have sanctioned government-spon-
sored abduction of the defendants and which pass muster under the effi-
ciency justification. 220 Israel did not behave wantonly. It allowed both
crew and passengers to resume their travel after it determined that the
targeted individuals were not on board; and though Israel presented a self-
defense justification, it nevertheless accepted the UN's criticism without
further protest or resistance.2 2 1 International institutions succeeded in
regulating Israel's use of self-help-thirteen years separated the two inci-
dents-without limiting Israel to the use of prolonged extradition or depor-
tation procedures to obtain jurisdiction over terrorists from nonextradition
nations, an effort that would have done little to prevent imminent
218. Id.
219. See id. at 191 (contrasting the absence of casualties in the 1973, 1985, and 1986
aircraft interceptions, with, inter alia, the 1986 U.S. air strike against Libya which killed
the stepdaughter of the Libyan leader Colonel Qadhafi).
220. Imminence is discussed in detail infra Part III.C.
221. See Beck & Arend, supra note 5, at 177-78.
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attacks.2 22
Moreover, the critical U.S. reactions to the 1973 interception and the
Obeid abduction are incompatible with its own behavior in the Yunis and
Alvarez-Machain cases, and with the Achille-Lauro affair and the Ker-Frisbie
doctrine generally. Even its response to the 1986 action, approving a lim-
ited role for abduction on self-defense grounds yet still condemning the
Israeli action, appears inconsistent with Yunis and Alvarez-Machain.
Israel's lack of success in capturing any terrorists may lie at the root of U.S.
criticism. A failed operation by an ally is harder to justify to international
counterparts, especially when that country seeks to broker peace in the
affected region. This is supported by a comparison to the aftermath of
"successful" U.S. air strikes against Libya in 1986, where instead of being
outraged, Western nations instituted sanctions and condemned Libya's
sponsoring of terrorism. 2 23 Yet, the Israeli episodes represented harmless
failures; indeed a deterrence argument might even label them as suc-
cesses. 224 Under the efficient breach theory, the Israeli abductions fall
within the bounds of acceptability. The government, intending to defend
its security, targeted threats from noncooperative states, thus preserving
international order by recognizing and punishing the breach. Therefore,
lack of success is not fatal to a self-help attempt under the efficiency
justification.
B. Alvarez-Machain: An Unjustifiable Abduction
Alvarez-Machain, however, posits conditions arguably outside the
appropriate scope for forcible abduction. In this instance, the victim
state's inaction does not temper the criticism that the abducting country's
claim to jurisdiction is tenuous. Rather, in this case, an extradition treaty
was in force, and the targeted nation had not refused a request to prosecute
or extradite. 2 25 Unlike Egypt in the Achille-Lauro affair, Mexico harbored
no ulterior motives, nor did it engage in deception; instead, the United
States violated sovereignty solely on the basis of a tortured reading of treaty
law. Additionally, the situs of the crime and the host nation's interest in
prosecuting defendant-nationals argue in favor of Mexico as the forum con-
veniens. Even if the target was a group of terrorists rather than a criminal,
the damage to international comity exceeds the imminent harm, and the
failure to request extradition or to exhaust alternatives leaves the precondi-
tions to reprisal unsatisfied.
222. See Dunoff & Trachtman, supra note 13, at 31 (indicating that the efficient
breach theory presupposes effective enforcement mechanisms that can determine and
compel payment in the event of a breach).
223. See Seymour, supra note 167, at 239.
224. See Morrison, supra note 13, at 209-10 (observing that a country will often
retaliate when another country breaches its obligations under a treaty in order to deter
future breaches and arguing that this practice can give "teeth" to international law).
225. See Biblowit, supra note 120, at 105 (indicating that, while informal discussions
had occurred, at no time had the United States entered a formal request with Mexican
officials for extradition).
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Indeed, the South African court's concern for international order is
more consistent with the efficient breach doctrine than the U.S. Supreme
Court's liberal reading of treaty obligations. Despite the objective "suc-
cess" in Alvarez-Machain and the comparative "failure" of the Israeli inter-
ceptions, efficiency theory supports the Israeli interception because it was
in response to an imminent threat, exhibited jurisdictional self-restraint,
promoted good international relations, and did not breach to a greater
extent than necessary, all of which cannot be said for the U.S. abduction in
Alvarez-Machain; in that case there was no threat to national interest, no
necessity for self-defense, and therefore no efficiency justification.
C. A Question of Imminence
The Alvarez-Machain majority opinion can be interpreted to support
efficient breach. Although the Court's approach does not say so explicitly,
its reasoning suggests that treaty law does not prevent efficient breach any
more than UN provisions do. The Alvarez-Machain case also focuses dis-
cussion on the level of imminence necessary to legitimate a forcible abduc-
tion. Under the dominant view of anticipatory defense, the feared attack
must be imminent. 226 Secretary of State Daniel Webster provided the clas-
sic articulation of this standard during the famous Caroline incident in the
nineteenth century.2 27 According to Webster, self-defense should "be con-
fined to cases in which the necessity of that self-defense is instant, over-
whelming, and leaving no choice of means, and no moment for
deliberation. '228 Preparation alone is insufficient. The Nuremberg Tribu-
nal spoke approvingly of this principle when it evaluated (and rejected)
Germany's claim that its invasion of Norway in 1940 constituted legitimate
self-defense.
22 9
Traditional self-defense analysis counsels hesitation and exhaustion of
defensive measures before taking any preemptive action.230 Under this
view, imminence is relative: as defensive options become more limited or
226. See Schmitt, supra note 181, at 647.
227. In 1837, a group of armed men took over Navy Island, which is on the Canadian
side of the Niagara River but also close to New York. The men were among the many
U.S. nationals who assisted the Canadian rebels. Navy Island served as a base from
which to attack mainland Canada and supply weapons to the rebels. The Caroline, an
American steamer, transported men and weapons between New York and Navy Island.
A British commander attacked the Caroline while she was in U.S. territory. Two U.S.
nationals were killed, and the Caroline was burned and sent over Niagara Falls. The
United States protested the attack, but Britain denied any wrongdoing and defended the
attack as necessary to enforce its laws along the frontier and therefore a legitimate exer-
cise of self-defense. In response, American Secretary of State Webster renewed his pro-
test setting forth the concepts now known as the Caroline doctrine. JOHN BASSETT
MOORE, 2 A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW § 217, at 409-14 (1906).
228. Letter from Daniel Webster, U.S. Secretary of State, to Lord Alexander B. Ashbur-
ton, U.K. Ambassador, Destruction of the Caroline, Aug. 6, 1842, in MOORE, supra note
228, § 217, at 411-12 (1906).
229. International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg), Judgment and Sentences, reprinted
in 41 AM. J. INT'L L. 172, 205 (1947).
230. For the position of the Bush Doctrine on preemptive action see supra note 1 and
accompanying text.
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less likely to succeed, preemptive action becomes more acceptable. 23 '
However, terrorism cripples this analysis. Terrorists are difficult to locate
and track, their activities are by definition clandestine, and-Resolution
1373 notwithstanding-they are not subject to the constraints of interna-
tional law or custom. Therefore, regardless of the strength of the terrorist
group, a state that hesitates to act against terrorists may lose the opportu-
nity to act at all. 23 2 Thus, the proper standard for imminence is "more
likely than not" rather than "beyond the shadow of a doubt."
This preponderance standard allows a threatened nation to protect
itself but prevents wanton and reckless activity. Before resorting to self-
help, a state would have to perform a rational calculation, which would
entail considering the feasibility of alternative remedies, the risk of error or
harm to civilians, and the credibility of the threat. The standard also
retains a temporal element, which considers how soon the attack is likely
to occur. A claim of an imminent threat must be supported by documenta-
tion of past terrorist activity, strong evidence of a future attack, or both,
lest a government abuse the self-help justification-for example, to remove
political enemies. Additionally, while imminence is a powerful factor, a
government must also assess the issue of international gridlock and the
potential effects on international stability and peace when weighing the
costs and benefits of self-help as applied to the particular situation. Under
this modified imminence standard, the "ticking time bomb" scenario 233 is
sufficiently imminent, while the Alvarez-Machain case is not because the
defendant's offense was relatively limited in scope, there was no evidence
suggesting the defendant would commit future offenses, and the United
States had failed to exhaust existing remedies. Generally, traditional
means of resolving international conflicts are more useful when a threat is
less imminent-that is, the more time remains before the threat will be
actualized. Nonetheless, so long as there is credible evidence of a serious
threat, there should be a strong presumption in favor of respecting the deci-
sion of a state that it is necessary to abduct a terrorist defendant.
The Israeli interceptions qualify as imminent under a more likely than
not standard because there was strong evidence of past attacks, despite
U.S. claims to the contrary, and the likelihood of future terrorism was
strong. Meeting the imminence standard, therefore, does not require objec-
tive success; the accused could have been plotting to attack a different tar-
get than the one presumed or might ultimately not be on board the carrier,
and the imminence standard would still be satisfied. For example, if the
wanted terrorist had been on board during one of the Israeli interceptions
231. Schmitt, supra note 181, at 647; see also Kash, supra note 8, at 147 ("[A] state can
seize a terrorist in another country as long as the capture is necessary to prevent future
harm to its citizens .... ").
232. Schmitt, supra note 181, at 648.
233. See, e.g., ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, WHY TERROISM WORKS: UNDERSTANDING THE
THREAT, RESPONDING TO THE CHALLENGE (2002); Interview by Greta Van Susteren with
Alan Dershowtiz, Felix Frankfurter Professor of Law, Harvard Law School, for Fox on
the Record (Sept. 3, 2002), available at 2002 WL 5,600,476 (supporting judicially regu-
lated state torture of a detainee, where authorities know that there is a ticking bomb).
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but was targeting a different interest from that which intelligence evidence
had suggested, the principle would still be satisfied because there would
have been an imminent threat, although not that which intelligence author-
ities had suspected. The preponderance standard ensures that the practice
will be used carefully, yet it recognizes the inherent limits on the evidence
available where secretive terrorist activity is involved.
The standard is not overly rigid: a threat might not be very imminent,
yet the practice could still be justifiable on efficiency grounds. For
instance, if a terrorist cell had been dormant, the threat would not be immi-
nent; yet, if the harm it had caused in the past was grave, if there was signif-
icant potential for deterrence, if traditional international means of conflict
resolution had failed, if the territorial violation was limited, and if the mis-
sion was precise, a forcible abduction might be justified or even required,
low level of imminence notwithstanding.
Critics warn that an increase in forcible abductions will generate vio-
lent retaliation rather than resort to formal complaint. 234 However, fears
of rampant lawlessness and unregulated abductions have not been vali-
dated by actual practice; one commentator notes that only Israel and the
United States have used force in response to terrorism.2 35 Political capital
is too limited, resources too scarce, and the risk too high to entertain an
extensive program of forcible abduction. The efficiency theory would
encourage objectors, like the South African court, to try abducted defend-
ants on criminal charges and to rely upon international impetus to resolve
sovereignty concerns, even if they object to the reasoning of Alvarez-
Machain. Countries should-and have-used transnational forcible abduc-
tion as legitimate self-help and not as a broad mandate for subduing politi-
234. For example, on July 3, 1988, the guided missile cruiser U.S.S. Vincennes, under
command of Captain Will Rogers III, shot down an Iranian aircraft over the Persian Gulf
after the American crew had determined that the airbus was about to attack the cruiser.
A year later, a bomb exploded under the car of Captain Rogers's wife. Prior phone calls
strongly suggest that the attempt on her life was connected to the Iranian airbus inci-
dent. Abramovsky, supra note 73, at 201-02; see also Richard A. Serrano & Jane Fritsch,
FBI Puts Top Priority on Bombed Van, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 12, 1989, at Al; see also Iran OKs
Law Allowing American Arrests Abroad, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 1, 1989, at P1; see also Tyler
Raimo, Notes and Comments, Winning at the Expense of Law: The Ramifications of
Expanding Counter-Terrorism Law Enforcement Jurisdiction Overseas, 14 Am. U. INT'L L.
REv. 1473, 1502-04 (1999) (discussing the potential for retaliation); FBI Authority to
Seize Suspects Abroad: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of
the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 103rd Cong. 16, 41 (statement of Abraham Sofaer,
Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State). Another nation might invoke the U.S. legal
position, which approves of expanded international jurisdiction for law enforcement
agencies against the United States. Id. For example, Russia, acting through the KGB,
might assert jurisdiction to investigate alleged terrorists in the United States, possibly
without U.S. consent. Id. at 41-44. But see Bush, supra note 172, at 969-71 (arguing
that the cost in political capital limits governments' ability to use abduction and reprisal
as in law enforcement on a regular basis).
235. See Beck & Arend, supra note 5, at 191. But see Michael J. Bazyler, Capturing
Terrorists in the 'Wild Blue Yonder': International Law and the Achille Lauro and Libyan
Aircraft Incidents, 8 WHITTIER L. REV. 685, 695 (1986) (discussing an incident in which
two South Yemeni fighters intercepted a Djibouti commercial airliner over the Red Sea
and forced it to land at an airport in South Yemen).
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cal opponents. Admittedly, the "prosecute or extradite" method is
preferable where all nations involved are willing participants. However,
when the threat is high, jurisdiction is present, other nations are not coop-
erating, or international bodies are ineffective, forcible abduction is justifi-
able as a lesser breach that yields a better outcome.
In a post-September 11th environment where the international reach
of terrorism is clear, and the anti-terrorist rhetoric targets both terrorist
organizations and the states that harbor terrorists, self-help and forcible
abduction, in particular, may enjoy an expanded role. Some states, nota-
bly the United States and Israel, have endorsed this method by favoring an
expanded application of universal and passive personality jurisdiction.
These nations have also shown a willingness to interpret both customary
and treaty law to permit or even endorse abduction. The South African
court, on the other hand, has declined to assert jurisdiction over abducted
individuals for fear of disregarding international comity.
Countries that have adopted a policy of forcible abduction rely on
traditional justifications for infringing on territorial sovereignty, including
self-defense and prevention of future attacks by the particular target; how-
ever, criticisms that the practice encourages retaliation, violates customary
law, and that the abducting state lacks sufficient nexus with the crime lin-
ger. A third and more convincing justification allows for forcible abduc-
tion when it maximizes utility internationally-notably in cases where
there is an imminent threat and where other nations have breached their
duty to prosecute or extradite accused terrorists.
Conclusion
The self-help deployed in the Achille-Lauro and Yunis cases as well as in
the Israeli interceptions demonstrates that the efficient breach theory has
operated effectively in practice. In those cases, all the elements of the effi-
cient breach theory were met: (1) the abducting country had a legitimate
jurisdictional claim; (2) other states had failed to act; (3) the threat was
imminent; (4) the actions did not result in harm to bystanders or the
accused; (5) the actions were minimally intrusive; (6) a dangerous figure
was neutralized yet still enjoyed a fair trial; and (7) when there was protest,
international order was restored through official warning. The limits of the
theory are discernible, as evidenced by Alvarez-Machain-a case that argua-
bly tests those limits-but do not defeat its persuasiveness. The efficiency
justification obviates the need for formalistic interpretations or creative
extensions of state or international law as seen in Alvarez-Machain.
Instead, the practice is effectively regulated by existing instruments and, as
a result, has generally been used in a careful, targeted manner. Under this
theory, the United States could interrupt bin Laden's travel without any
legal discomfort and could help protect international interests, all without
damaging international relations. Reliance on reprisal would be justified
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because here, self-help would ensure the neutralization of an international
threat to peace and security, and existing international bodies could
respond effectively to any protest. Thus, forcible abduction has a proper
role within both the Bush Doctrine and international law.

